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MACNIVEN V. WESTMORELAND AND
TAX ADVICE:
USING "PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM" TO
DEAL WITH TAX SHELTERS AND
PROMOTE LEGITIMATE TAX ADVICE
ScoTT

A. SCHUMACHER*

The last few years have seen a flurry of activity aimed at the tax shelterindustry. Beginning
with the "covered opinion" rules of Treasury Circular230 in 2005, the government has adopted
several changes to the standards applicable to tax advice, all in an effort to stop abusive tax
shelters. Recently, both Congress (in 2007) and the Treasury (in 2008) have revised the
standards applicable to tax advice to require that a position have a "more likely than not"
chance of succeeding on the merits, or the position must be disclosed to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). While the government's desire for reform is understandable,these changes will
not stop abusive shelters and will make giving legitimate tax advice more difficult. Moreover,
these changes will also not succeed in what should be their ultimate goal-providingguidance
for distinguishingbetween legitimate tax planningand abusive tax avoidance.
My thesis in this Article is that whatever rules Congress, the Treasury, and the courts
employ, these rules should be designed to encourage tax advice and to encourage that the advice
given is proper. Our tax system is based on voluntary compliance, which requires a wellinformed and well-advised citizenry. The recent amendments will, I fear, stifle tax advice,
including legitimate advice. By the same token, the overly aggressive prior standard for tax
advice of "realistic possibility of success" encouraged hyper-textualism and led too many
advisors and their clients to review a position on a "can I get away with this" analysis, rather
than honestly attempting to comply with the law.
The standard that I propose is what I refer to as "purposivetextualism" and is taken from
the British House of Lords' opinion by Lord Hoffmann in MacNiven v. Westmoreland.
Under the MacNiven analysis, one must analyze the "constructive purpose" of the tax statute
and then determine whether the relevant provision of the statute, upon its true construction,
applies to the facts at issue. While the House of Lords referred to this standard as "purposive
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construction," the standardis more akin to the modern textualism that looks at the purpose of
the statute in the context that Congress (or Parliament)enacted it. In my view, the MacNiven
formulation gives us the most principled basis for determining what is an abusive tax shelter
and what is legitimate tax planning. It is also a workable constructionfor tax advisors. It is my
hope that a discussion of the MacNiven opinion will offer a different perspective on the issue of
tax shelters and tax advice and bring a fresh debate to these issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The last few years have seen a flurry of activity aimed at the tax
shelter industry.'
Beginning with the "covered opinion" rules of
Treasury Circular 230,2 the government has adopted several changes to
the standards applicable to tax advice, all in an effort to stop abusive tax3
shelters. Recently, both Congress (in 2007) and the Treasury (in 2008)
revised the standards applicable to tax advice to require that the
position have a "more likely than not" chance of succeeding on the
merits, or the position must be disclosed to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).4
While the government's desire for reform is understandable, these
changes will not stop abusive shelters and will make the giving of
legitimate tax advice more difficult.5 More importantly, these changes
will not succeed in what should be their ultimate goal-providing
guidance for• distinguishing
between legitimate tax planning and abusive
6
tax avoidance. Indeed, what often gets lost in the discussion of tax
shelters is the fact that the vast majority of taxpayers are trying to

1. This flurry of activity has, of course, included numerous articles by tax scholars. See,
e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005); Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti,
Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory
and Tax Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357 (2006); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths
About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply To Professor Weisbach, 55
TAX L. REV. 325 (2002). It is therefore with more than mild trepidation that I wade into this
area with yet another article on tax shelters.
2. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007).
3. Many of the administrative actions in this area have been taken by the Treasury
Department, the Internal Revenue Service, or both. For simplicity's sake, I will refer to the
Treasury Department and the IRS collectively as the Treasury.
4. These recent legislative and administrative activities elevated the standard for return
advice to more likely than not. See, e.g., U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246(b)(2)(B),
121 Stat. 200 (2007). If the advisor cannot reach this relatively high standard, the position
must be disclosed.
5. Randolph E. Paul warned of this problem in 1937 when he advised: "Care should also
be used in the selection of measures to prevent avoidance which will not bear down unduly
upon those who are not avoiding taxes. Taxing statutes are usually, and perhaps must always
for constitutional reasons be, put in general terms, and the effect of some measures directed
at tax-avoidance mechanisms is often ... to cause, 'like Herod's massacre,' great suffering
without reaching the particular cases which inspired it." RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN
FEDERAL TAXATION: TAXATION WITHOUT MISREPRESENTATION 65 (1937) (footnotes
omitted).
6. In making this statement, I reject the contention of Professor David Weisbach that all
tax planning is necessarily abusive and creates nothing of value. See David A. Weisbach, Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002).
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comply with the law and that their advisors are doing their best to
inform their clients about what the law provides. Moreover, the new
anti-shelter initiatives rely primarily upon disclosure and penalties to
root out abusive schemes.7 But, as others have noted, disclosure is not
the solution.8
In addition, recent court decisions are unlikely to be helpful in
providing guidance to advisors and helping them determine whether a
position is "more likely than not" to be successful. While the economic
substance and business purpose doctrines, at least in their current
iterations, may generally provide the correct result to the case at hand, 9
they offer little constructive guidance to distinguish between tax
planning and tax abuse.1"
Indeed, while some transactions are
invalidated because they lack economic substance apart from tax
savings, many transactions that are entered into solely for tax purposes
are acceptable under the tax laws. 1 The economic substance and
business purpose analyses used by courts offer little in the way of
guidance for future cases.
My thesis in this Article is that whatever rules Congress, the
Treasury, and the courts employ, these rules should be designed to
encourage tax advice and to encourage that the advice given is proper.
The system, whatever it is, must work with or at least co-opt tax
professionals. Given the low audit coverage, in order for the tax system
to work with any modicum of efficiency, tax professionals must be
encouraged to properly advise their clients on what the law is.12 The
recent amendments do just the opposite.

7. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6011, 6694, 6707A (West 2007); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6707, 6708 (2000
& Supp. V 2005).
8. See, e.g., Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1942; David M. Schizer, Enlisting the
Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 369, 370 (2006).
9. However, the different treatment by various courts suggests that the analysis under
these tests is more of an art form than a science.
10. Every case seems to turn on the Potter Stewart pornography test of "I know it when
I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (not "trying to
define what may be indefinable ... [b]ut I know it when I see it"); see also ACM P'ship v.
Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) ("I can't help but suspect
that the majority's conclusion ... is, in its essence, something akin to a 'smell test."').
11. See, e.g., tax-free reorganizations, 26 U.S.C. § 368 (2000); tax-free exchanges of
property, 26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Subchapter Selections, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1362
(West 2007); Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) elections, 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)
(2000); the annual exclusion for gift tax purposes, 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2000); just to name a
few.
12. See Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into
DissuadingCorporateTax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73 (2001).
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Ultimately, whether the analysis is being done by a tax attorney, the
IRS, or a federal judge, the task should be to determine what the law is
and what Congress intended. The overly aggressive "realistic possibility
of success" and "reasonable basis" standards for tax advice encouraged
hyper-textualism and led too many advisors and their clients to review a
position on a "can I get away with this" analysis, rather than honestly
attempting to comply with the law. On the other hand, selectively
imposing economic realism on the tax system, a system that is based in
large part on legal and fiscal fictions, provides no guidance to taxpayers
or their advisors and may indeed add to the cynicism surrounding the
tax system.'3
The standard that I propose is what I will refer to as "purposive
textualism"' 4 and is taken from the British House of Lords' opinion by
Lord Hoffmann in MacNiven v. Westmoreland.5 Under this analysis,
one must analyze the "constructive purpose" of the tax statute and then
determine whether the transaction at issue is consistent with that
statutory purpose. In my view, the MacNiven formulation gives us the
most principled basis for determining what is an abusive tax shelter and
what is legitimate tax planning. It is also a workable construction for tax
advisors, which, if employed appropriately, should provide for
legitimate tax advice to clients.
Part II of this Article will deal with how we got to where we are, the
rise of the mega-shelter industry, and how the realistic possibility of
success standard and the economics of the system led to this problem. 6
13. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has identified three ways in which the
increase in shelter activity has adversely impacted the administration of the tax laws. First,
the limited audit resources of the IRS have been diverted to focus on tax shelters. Second,
the courts have been burdened by a substantial increase in the number of pending cases.
Third, the rise of the tax-shelter industry may have contributed significantly to the general
deterioration in compliance by undermining taxpayer confidence in the fairness and
effectiveness of the tax laws. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., PROPOSALS
RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER TAX-MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS 6 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS].
14. As discussed more fully infra Part IV.B, there has, of course, been much written on
the differences and similarities of the textualist and purposive approach to statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?,106
COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). My use of the phrase "purposive textualism" is not meant to
diminish the distinction between these two schools. Rather, it is a description of the
methodology employed by the House of Lords in MacNiven and is designed to highlight the
new paradigm in textualism as recognized by Professor Manning.
MacNiven
v.Westmoreland, [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, T 29 (UKHC).
15. MacNiven, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, 1$ 19-75.
16. It is only by examining the shelter problem in full (or at least, fullish) context that a
suitable resolution can be found.
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This part will trace the role of tax advisors in the tax system from the
adoption of the income tax to the present. What I hope to show is that
the prior system encouraged aggressive tax positions across the board
and led, 17 at least in part, to the tax shelter wars we are mired in today.
While this antebellum regimen may have been appropriate at the time,18
it is no longer sustainable.
Part III will look at the recent rules adopted and proposed by the
government to deal with shelters. While a whole host of provisions are
in play here, I will focus on the new provisions that are emblematic of
the efforts of Congress and the Treasury, namely the covered opinion
rules of Circular 230 and the revisions to the opinion standards by
amended § 6694 of Title 26 of the U.S. Code. In this part, I will show
why the current efforts are not an answer to the problem and will, in
fact, create larger problems.
Finally, in Part IV of the Article, I will discuss what the standard
should be. The House of Lords, in MacNiven, provides us with a
method for analyzing tax statutes, which in turn leads to a workable
standard for tax advice. While the House of Lords referred to this
standard as "purposive construction," in my view the standard is more
akin to the modern textualism that looks at the purpose of the statute in
the context that Congress (or Parliament) enacted it. While the issues
and analysis employed by the Lord Justices in MacNiven have much in
common with the opinions of some U.S. courts, it is nevertheless my
hope that a review of that opinion will offer a different perspective on
the issue of tax shelters and tax advice and bring a fresh debate to these
issues. I am not so naive as to think that my new standard will be the
answer to all of the ills that face tax practice or that it is a "silver
bullet."1 9 However, like the introduction of the MacNiven decision into
the tax shelter debate in the United States, I hope my analysis will move
the debate in a salubrious direction.

17. And by "prior system" I mean the rules and standards prior to 2005, when the
covered opinion rules of the Department of Treasury § 10.35 of Circular No. 230 were
adopted, which in my view altered the tax landscape for good. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007). One
could certainly pick another date or event to demarcate the "Tax BCE," but this date seems
as good as any.
18. Some scholars have argued that the realistic possibility of success standard was
misguided from its launch. See, e.g., Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real
Ethics: A Critique of ABA FormalOpinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643, 643 (1986).
19. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1951 (attempting to mold a "silver
bullet" to attack shelters).
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II. How DID WE GET HERE?
And you may ask yourself
Am I right? ...Am I wrong?
And you may tell yourself
20
MY GOD! ...WHAT HAVE I DONE?
For most of the relatively brief history of the income tax, tax lawyers
were given wide latitude to advise clients, with few standards governing
advice, save the general standards of the ABA. 21 When standards were
eventually adopted by the government, the standards were
comparatively lax.22 Those standards have recently been replaced by a
more draconian regime. 23 This part traces the history of tax compliance
and tax lawyers' roles in that system.
A. Tax Avoidance and the Nature of the Tax Law
Even prior to the enactment of the income tax in 1913, tax avoidance
was an issue for the government, the courts, and lawyers.
The people who used the tax on tea as the spark to ignite a
revolution and who had included in their constitution a prohibition
against any direct tax by their federal government were not likely to
discuss morality and taxes in the same breath. The tax collector was an
intruder, and if you could escape his clutches, you were in the same
fortunate position as someone who had escaped smallpox or
diphtheria.24
In one of the first cases to address the issue of tax avoidance, the
Supreme Court held that if the tax avoidance "is carried out by the
means of legal forms, it is subject to no legal censure."25 While this

20. TALKING HEADS, Once in a Lifetime, on REMAIN IN LIGHT (Warner Bros. Records
1980).
21. The original thirty-two Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908. See Preface to MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, at ix
(1986).
22. Treas. Dep't Cir. No. 230 § 10.22 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(w) (1938) (requiring tax
professionals to exercise "due diligence" in preparing and advising on tax return positions);
Treas. Dep't Cir. No. 230 § 10.34 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994) (requiring a realistic chance
of success on the merits, defined as a one-in-three chance of success).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning,10 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1067, 1068
(1952).
25. United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. 496, 506 (1873).
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formalistic approach may have stemmed in part from the anti-tax history
of the United States, it is also the result of the nature of the tax laws.26
In constructing the right ethical model for tax advice, one must begin
with the premise that tax planning and minimization are both inevitable
and unavoidable. I do not use these terms in a fatalistic sense that all
men are evil and that there are insufficient resources to rid us of the
scourge of tax avoidance. 27 Rather, tax planning and minimization are
unavoidable because the tax laws are necessarily an exercise in line
drawing.' As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "[W]hen the law
draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe
side is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full
of what the law permits."29 Thus, the line drawing that is inherent in tax
law inevitably causes taxpayers and their advisors to plan their affairs to
fall on one side of the law or the other.30
This idea is developed by the oft-quoted statement regarding taxes,
that of Judge Learned Hand: "Any one may so arrange his affairs that
his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes."31 As with Justice Holmes's averment,
Judge Hand's statement is not a normative judgment, nor is it, as many
shelter promoters and others have argued, "a license to circumvent rules
32
on the claim of assisting taxpayers in so arranging their affairs."
Rather, it is a statement regarding the nature of the tax laws.33 This
must be fully understood in formulating an appropriate ethical standard
for tax lawyers. Tax minimization, or arranging one's affairs in such a
26. Norris Darrell, Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice, reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 87, 100 (Boris I. Bittker ed.,

1970) ("It is for the government to determine what taxes should be paid and in what
circumstances .... To infer that there is something morally wrong with avoiding tax in a
legitimate way, there being no fraud, deceit or make-believe, is pure hypocrisy.").
27. Much of the law surrounding this is based on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's bad
man theory of law. See Falk, supra note 18, at 648.
28. See PAUL, supra note 5, at 19 ("As long as taxes are imposed, there will be
transactions in which the tax will be greater one way than another way, or in which one way
will be above the suspicion attaching to another way.").
29. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 (1916).
30. See PAUL, supra note 5, at 101; Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and Responsibility in
Tax Practice:The Need for Definition,20 TAX L. REV. 237, 252 (1965).
31. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).

32. Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters:
Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 241
n.114 (2004).

33. Darrell, supra note 26.
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way to comply with the tax laws, or however one wants to characterize
it, is a necessary part of the tax lawyer's role. 3 Policy makers must
recognize the inevitability of tax advice and tax minimization in
formulating appropriate standards so as to ensure both that tax advice is
given and that the advice given is proper.
In addition, unlike other areas of the law that arguably have a moral
component to them, there is nothing inherently moral or immoral in the
tax laws.35 As one commentator stated,
If there are two bridges across a river, one a toll bridge
and the other free, both leading to the same destination,
there is no moral reason whatsoever why the traveler
shouldn't choose the free one. If the law permits a
taxpayer to arrange to make a profit in such a way that it
is taxable as capital gain and not as ordinary income,
there
is no moral reason whatsoever why he shouldn't do
36
it.

Thus, the tax laws either permit a certain deduction or they do not.37
There is no touchstone, apart from the law itself, requiring a
taxpayer to pay a certain amount of tax.3 8 There is no absolute right
34. Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 412, 415
(1953).
35. One of the most famous quotes in this regard is from J.P. Morgan, who stated,
"Income tax evasion is a legal, not a moral question. Anyone has a right to do anything the
law does not say is wrong." BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL
TAX PRACTICE, at xxxii (3d ed. 1995).
36. Darrell, supra note 26, at 100.
37. See, e.g., Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a Dual Responsibility to
His Client and to the Government-The Theory, 15 S. CAL. TAX INST. 25, 26 (1963) ("No
taxpayer can be asked to pay a tax which he considers to be 'fair' under some abstract code of
morality. An absolute requisite is a rule book-a written set of rules whose meaning is
reasonably clear and explicit.").
38. There is, of course, a question as to whether the law, simply because it is the law,
must be followed. As a result, the arbitrary provisions of the revenue laws are, and just as
importantly are perceived as, quite distant from clear mandates such as "thou shall not kill" or
"no parking vehicles in the park." Thus, on a more theoretical or philosophical level is the
question of whether we are bound to follow the law merely because it is the law. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594
(1958). This issue has been picked up by Professors Joseph Raz and John Finnis, among
others, who have carried the debate forward. John Finnis, The Authority of Law in the
Predicamentof ContemporarySocial Theory, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 115,
115-16 (1984); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 139, 139, 140, 141 (1984). Professor Raz's position is that there is
no inherent justification for following the law merely because it is the law, and citizens are
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amount of tax or a pure amount of tax. Certainly being straight and
honest with the government should be required, but that only begs the
question as to what constitutes being straight and honest with the
government. 9 Thus, despite Justice Holmes's aphorism, "I like to pay
taxes. With them I buy civilization," 0 not even the most pro-tax
individual can decide what is the "correct" amount of tax. There is no
correct amount of tax independent of what Congress has declared it to
be.41
B. The Role of Tax Advisors in Tax Planning
While tax law is inherently an exercise in line drawing, the line
drawn by Congress has not always been crystalline. 2 Given that
taxpayers are required to pay only their "fair share," who decides what
entitled to question the validity of even duly enacted laws. Id. at 141. While the vast majority
of citizens have never heard of Professor Raz, let alone read his work, it appears that most
Americans are rather Razian in their attitudes toward the tax code.
39. See Tony Honor6, The Dependence of Morality on Law, 13 OXFORD J.LEGAL
STUD. 1, 5 (1993).

According to most people's moral outlook members of a community
should make a contribution to the expense of meeting collective needs....
So members of a community have in principle a moral obligation to pay
taxes. But this obligation is incomplete or, if one prefers inchoate, apart
from law. It has no real content until the amount or rate of tax is fixed by
an institutional decision, by law. What amounts to a reasonable
contribution is not otherwise determinable, since what is required is a coordinated scheme which can be defended as fair not merely in the
aggregate amount it raises but in its distribution. Taxpayers cannot settle
it for themselves, as people can within limits settle for themselves, say, the
proper way of showing respect for the feelings of others. Apart from law
no one has a moral obligation to pay any particular amount of tax. An
obligation to pay an indeterminate sum is not an effective obligation; it
requires only a disposition, not an action. So, apart from law no one has
an effective obligation to pay tax.
Id.
40. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43

(1938).
41. Nor, practically, can one really pay more tax than is due. Section 6402 of the
Internal Revenue Code requires the government, subject to the limitations of § 6402, to
refund any overpayment to the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6402 (2000); see also Jones v. Liberty
Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531 (1947) ("[W]e read the word 'overpayment' in its usual sense, as
meaning any payment in excess of that which is properly due .... Whatever the reason, the
payment of more than is rightfully due is what characterizes an overpayment.").
42. Judge Learned Hand said about the income tax that the words that otherwise seem
to "dance before [our] eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference,
exception upon exception--couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of."
Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
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that amount is? Professor Judith Freedman cogently argues that
obviously it should not be the taxpayer who makes this determination.43
Resolving these ambiguities is delegated, at least in the first instance, to
tax advisors. This highlights the fundamental role tax advisors play in
the tax system. Tax attorneys and accountants help clients navigate the
murky waters of the tax code and help taxpayers understand what the
law requires." Tax advisors also provide clients with creative solutions
to limit their tax liabilities and with protection from accuracy related
penalties if the tax plan does not work out as designed. This ability to
"add value" has encouraged the more risk-tolerant and wealthy
taxpayers to take positions that are not legitimate and to pay large fees
for the advice.
From the beginning of the income tax, there have always been those
who will seek to pay as little as possible. The battle cry of the American
Revolution was not "libert, 6galit, fraternit," but rather, "no taxation
without representation., 45 Public opinion polls have consistently shown
a hostility toward taxes and the IRS. 4' This disdain for income taxes
cuts across ideological and political lines and reflects the public's dislike
of government and the programs funded by the government. 4 Thus,

43. Judith Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General AntiAvoidance Principle,BRIT. TAX REV., July-Aug. 2004, at 332, 334 ("It is inevitable that there
will be fundamental tensions between the essential need of governments to raise revenue and
the lack of desire of taxpayers to pay for this. Quite apart from differences about the size and
role of the state, which are obviously to be decided in the ballot box in a democratic society,
each taxpayer will consider that he should pay only his 'fair share.' What is his fair share may
be a matter for argument, but what is clear is that the taxpayer himself is 'not the proper
person to decide what it should be."' (footnote omitted)).
44. Robert H. Jackson, Changes in Treasury Tax Policy, 12 TAXES 342, 343 ("In
applying a technical law which few have read, and voluminous regulations known to fewer,
and opinions and decisions some of which are not even published, errors will be made,
differences of opinion will arise.").
45. This is not to imply that tax shelters or the desire to pay less taxes is a uniquely
American phenomenon. See, e.g., Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive
Transactions: Why Today's Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to "Just
Say No," in J-736 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPINOFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 409, 41112 (Practising Law Institute 2006) (recounting tax dodges throughout history since the times
of ancient Rome). Moreover, my solution to the shelter problem is based in large part upon
the House of Lords' decision in MacNiven v.Westmoreland, [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311
(UKHC).
46. See Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX
REV. 645, 692 nn.206-07 (2003).
47. In two Fox News/Opinion Dynamics polls taken in 2002 and 2005, between seventyone percent and seventy-five percent of respondents objected to how their tax dollars were
The poll is available at
spent, rather than the amount of taxes they paid.
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whether you are an anti-war liberal or a pro-life conservative, you can
find some reason not to want to fully fund the government. 48 Another
public sentiment is that while only fourteen percent have ever been even
tempted to cheat on their own taxes, these same people believe that
thirty-nine percent of their neighbors are cheating on their taxes.49
Thus, there is a belief that only a fool pays his full amount of tax, or as
Leona Helmsley so eloquently stated, "Only the little people pay
taxes."50 And there is a belief that if we only find the right tax advisor,
we will only be required to pay that which we are constitutionally
obligated to forfeit.5
The imposition of penalties and the role of tax attorneys in shielding
clients from these penalties must be emphasized. While it is true that
tax lawyers are lawyers who happen to specialize in a given area (i.e.,
tax), tax lawyers' ability to insulate their clients from penalties, merely
by giving them advice, is unusual in law.52
Thus, the normal
generalizations and positive exhortations of the rules of professional
conduct are insufficient for tax advice. Tax lawyers hold the key to
understanding the tax laws and to protecting clients from penalties, and
financial incentives have usually caused lawyers to side with clients.
Whatever rules or standards are adopted must take into account the tax
lawyer's unique role in the tax system.
C. Standards Applicable to Tax Advice
Unlike many legal specialties, tax lawyers do not have a venerable
tradition to compel adherence to fixed ethical rules.53 Indeed, in an
http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
48. Freedman, supra note 43, at 337 (noting the same attitude in United Kingdom).
49. Blum
&
Weprin/NBC
poll,
April
2005,
available
at
http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
50. The Associated Press, Maid Testifies Helmsley Denied Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 1989, at B2 (quoting Leona Helmsley).
51. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1074 ("Most people think of us as having a bag of tricks
that greatly reduces our clients' taxes and probably gets us out altogether on our own.").
52. See, e.g., People v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 202 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248 (Ct. App. 1984)
(rejecting defense to civil penalties of reliance on advice of counsel).
53. Compare the archetypical duties of the zealous advocate, summarized by Lord
Brougham in 1821 in his defense of Queen Caroline:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may
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article from 1953, Randolph Paul states that until that time, "very few
tax lawyers [even gave] much thought to the ethics that should govern"
the profession and that there was no clear set of guidelines governing
how tax advice should be dispensed. 4 Despite the fact that the Treasury
had been given authority in 1884 to promulgate rules of practice before
it, 55 the Treasury did little to dictate the rules applicable to tax
professionals in rendering return advice. The original version of
Circular 230 did not contain any standards for advice or preparations of
returns;56 the first version of Circular 230 to include any standard
regarding tax advice did not appear until 1938." 7 Even then, the
standard required practitioners only to "exercise due diligence" in
preparing or assisting in the preparation of returns and other
documents.58 This standard appeared to require tax professionals to do
some independent investigation but did not set forth any criteria
regarding how ambiguities in the statute should be resolved. 9 However,
given the complexity of the tax laws and the broad application of these
arcane statutes, disputes with the IRS as to how the Code should be
interpreted were bound to occur. And, given that penalties were
imposed for failure to follow the dictates of the Code, the issue of the
standards applicable to taxpayers and their advisors would inevitably
come to the fore.
Negligence penalties were first added to the Code in 1918. 60 The
penalty was a modest five percent of the total amount of the deficiency
and applied where an understatement was "due to negligence on the

bring upon others.
JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
PRACTICE 342 (2005) (citing Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers
as Bad Citizens, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 120 (1996)). The lawyer-as-zealous-advocate

standard has played a significant role, perhaps too significant, in the formulation of standards
of conduct relating to tax return advice.
54. Paul, supra note 34, at 412.

55. 23 Stat. 258 (1884). Indeed, it took more than 100 years for the Treasury to issue
final regulations that provided any real standards governing the rendering of tax advice. See
31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994); T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994); 1994-2 C.B. 415.
56. Circular 230 is the collection of rules governing practice before the Treasury. Rev.
Rul. 230, 4-1600A C.B. 408 (1921).
57. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(w) (1938).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083. For an excellent history of
the negligence penalty and other tax penalties, see Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties"They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?, " 43 FLA. L. REV. 811, 821-54 (1991).
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part of the taxpayer, but without intent to defraud, 6 1 or there was an
"intentional disregard of authorized rules and regulations with
knowledge thereof., 62 However, if the return was "made in good faith
and the understatement of the amount in the return [wa]s not due to any
fault of the taxpayer," no penalty would be imposed because of the
understatement.63
When cases requiring application of these standards reached the
courts, the resulting analyses, while conclusory, 6' nevertheless were the
foundation for the "reasonable basis" and "substantial authority"
standards, and endorsed the efficacy of disclosure in eluding penalties.
65 the Board of Tax Appeals
For example, in Senner v. Commissioner,
held that the petitioner should not be held liable for negligence because
the issues "are questions concerning which petitioner had reasonable
grounds to differ from the conclusions reached by the respondent., 66 In
67
Heffelfinger v. Commissioner, the Board refused to impose negligence
penalties for intentional disregard of rules and regulations but without
intent to defraud where the evidence showed that the petitioner
"honestly believed" that he had properly reported the income at issue
and because an "explanation was given of why the income was not
reported by the petitioner."68 The Board reaffirmed the conclusions in
6
1
these two cases in its decision in Davis Regulator Co. v. Commissioner
and held that "where full disclosure is made and the taxpayer has
'reasonable grounds to differ from the conclusion' of the Commissioner
that a tax is due, the negligence penalty should not be imposed."7
Finally, in Brockman Building Corp. v. Commissioner," the Tax Court
held that the Commissioner erred in determining that the petitioner was
liable for negligence penalties because the petitioner attached a rider to
its return, the return was prepared by a certified public accountant, and

61. Revenue Act of 1918 § 250(b).
62. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 265.

63. Id.; Revenue Act of 1918 § 250(b); see also Winslow, supra note 60, at 836-40.
64. The conclusory nature of this analysis persists to the current day. See, e.g., Osteen v.
Comm'r, 62 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1995) (chastising the Tax Court for its conclusory
application of the substantial understatement and substantial authority provisions).
65. 22 B.T.A. 655 (1931).

66. Id. at 658.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

32 B.T.A. 1232 (1935).
Id. at 1235.
36 B.T.A. 437 (1937).
Id. at 444 (citing Senner, 22 B.T.A. at 658; Heffelfinger, 32 B.T.A. at 1232).
21 T.C. 175 (1953).
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the petitioner had a "good faith,"
"bona fide" belief, all of which
72
cause.,
"reasonable
to
amounted
Thus, as originally formulated by the courts, insulation from
penalties was based on the reasonableness of the taxpayer's actions,73
which could be demonstrated by, among other things, reliance on the
advice of a professional and disclosure.74 The courts did not address the
standards tax professionals must use in giving advice to clients, but it
appears that underlying these standards was the assumption that
taxpayers and their advisors were attempting to find the right answer, or
at least had an honest dispute with the IRS as to how the law should be
interpreted.75
The first standards applicable to tax lawyers came not from the
Treasury or the courts, but from the ABA. 76 Formal Opinion 314 covers
several matters, including whether the IRS is a tribunal,77 as well as what
duties are owed to the IRS.78 Regarding the standards applicable to
rendering tax advice to clients, the opinion provides that
a lawyer who is asked to advise his client in the course of
the preparation of the client's tax returns may freely urge
the statement of positions most favorable to the client
just as long as there is reasonable basis for those
positions. Thus where the lawyer believes there is a
reasonable basis for a position that a particular
transaction does not result in taxable income, or that
certain expenditures are properly deductible as expenses,
the lawyer has no duty to advise that riders be attached

72. Id. at 191.
73. As Professors Boris Bittker and Martin McMahon noted, "[S]ince negligence is the
antithesis of reasonable behavior, a showing of reasonable cause for the underpayment in
effect negates the existence of negligence." BORIS I. BITKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS

45.3 (1988); see also Winslow, supra note

60, at 839.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Brockman Building Corp., 21 T.C. at 191.
See id.; Heffelfinger v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 1232, 1234-35 (1935).
See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
The ABA opined that the "Internal Revenue Service is neither a true tribunal, nor

even a quasi-judicial institution." Id.
78. Quoting various Canons of Ethics, Formal Opinion 314 provides that the lawyer may
not mislead the IRS, conceal facts, or commit fraud, and "should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession." Id. (quoting ABA CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHICS Canon 29 (1967)).
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to the client's tax return explaining the circumstances
surrounding the transaction or the expenditures.79
Thus, the first standard applicable to attorneys giving tax return advice
was the "reasonable basis" test. 0 If the lawyer believed that there was a
reasonable basis for a return position, the lawyer could freely advise that
position and was not required to advise the client to disclose that
position. 81
Formal Opinion 314 was subject almost immediately to criticism.82
The reasonable basis standard was described by notable commentators
as "anything you can articulate without laughing,,1 3 or as any position
that can be adopted "with little more than a chuckle." 84 More
fundamentally, the reasonable basis standard appeared to allow
attorneys to advise a position that they did not believe to be correct, as
long as it was "reasonable," which might well be inconsistent with the
taxpayer's statement in the jurat. 5 Opinion 314 also began with the
premise that the IRS and tax lawyers are adversaries. "Accordingly, it
viewed a tax return as a submission in an adversary proceeding and the
lawyer's ethical obligations of candor and zeal as essentially those of an
advocate."86
The next development in the standards applicable to taxpayers and
their advisors was the 1982 enactment of the substantial understatement
penalty.87 Under these new penalties, a taxpayer would be liable for a
twenty-percent penalty if the understatement of tax was substantial.88
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Comm. on Tax Policy, Tax Section N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, A Report on
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REV. 325, 330 (1972); Falk, supra note 18, at 64445; James R. Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client that He May Take a Position on His
Tax Return?, 29 TAx LAW. 237, 244 (1976). Formal Opinion 85-352 notes the "persistent
criticism by distinguished members of the tax bar, IRS officials and members of Congress."
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
83. Falk, supra note 18, at 644 (quoting Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters Addressed
at ABA Meeting, 22 TAX NOTES 757 (1984)).
84. James P. Holden, New Professional Standardsin the Tax Market Place: Opinions 314,
346 and Circular230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 235 (1985) (quoting Bernard Wolfman, Remarks
During Panel Discussion on ABA Formal Op. 314 Made at ABA Section of Taxation 1984
Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1984)).
85. See Rowen, supra note 82, at 250.
86. Falk, supra note 18, at 646.
87. 26 U.S.C. § 6661 (1982) (repealed 1989).
88. An understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of ten percent of the
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The amount of the understatement could be reduced if there was
substantial authority for the treatment or if the item was adequately
disclosed. 89 Known as the "audit lottery" penalty, the substantial
understatement penalty was designed to "create downside risk for
taxpayers who take aggressive, undisclosed positions."
This
development in the law regarding penalties called into question the
reasonable basis standard of Formal Opinion 314. Could a lawyer
advise a client to take a position on a return that did not have
substantial authority and advise the taxpayer not to disclose the
position? Doing so would, in essence, allow a lawyer to advise a client
to take a position that might subject the client to penalties.
The Treasury's response was that a lawyer could not ethically advise
such a position.91 In proposed regulations amending Circular 230, the
Treasury made its first attempt to provide more guidance on the
meaning of "due diligence" and stated that a practitioner should not, in
the exercise of due diligence, place his or her client in a position of being
assessed any of the accuracy-related penalties. 9
The proposed
regulations were also premised on the Treasury's concern that the
ethical standards of some practitioners regarding tax advice had eroded
over the years. 93 The Treasury believed this led to serious problems
concerning taxpayer compliance with the revenue laws, which adversely
affected the integrity of the voluntary, self-assessment tax system. 9 The
proposed regulations would have required a practitioner only to
recommend positions that were "supported by substantial authority";
otherwise the relevant facts were required to be disclosed.9
These proposed regulations were never adopted as final regulations.
After the substantial understatement penalties were enacted, and prior
amount of tax shown on the return or $5,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V
2005).
89. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
90. Falk, supra note 18, at 658 (citing Pascaner & Wolff, What Are the Professional's
Responsibilities Under the Substantial Understatement Rules?, 35 PRAC. ACCT. 392 (1985);
John Andr6 LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit
Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 38283 (1983)); Harvey M. Silets, TEFRA Penalties in Action, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTYTHIRD INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 9-1 (1985).

91. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, 29,113-14 (Aug. 14, 1986).
92. Id. at 29,114.
93. Id. at 29,113.
94. Id.
95. Id. The proposed regulations would also have prohibited a practitioner from
recommending or advising a client that a position be taken if the taxpayer would have been
liable for the substantial understatement penalties. Id. at 29,114.
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to the issuance of the proposed regulations, the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility adopted Formal

Opinion 85-352, which became the standard for tax return advice for the
next twenty years. 96 In that opinion, the ABA abandoned the
reasonable basis standard of Opinion 314 in an attempt to "elevate the
minimum ethical standard above that which 'reasonable basis' had come
to represent for many practitioners and others." 97 The committee noted

that the reasonable basis standard had been subjected to criticism by the
tax bar, the IRS, and members of Congress, and as a result, the
reasonable basis standard had been eroded as an ethical guideline.98
Under Formal Opinion 85-352,

a lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the
preparation of the client's tax return, may advise the
statement of positions most favorable to the client if the
lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are
warranted in existing law or can be supported by a good

faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law. A lawyer can have a good faith belief in
this context even if the lawyer believes the client's
position probably will not prevail. However, good faith

requires that there be some realistic possibility of success
if the matter is litigated. 9
The ABA therefore traded in the reasonable basis standard for the

"realistic possibility of success" standard.1°° In the ABA's view, the new
96. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). Like
all formal opinions issued by the ABA, Formal Opinion 85-352 was adopted by the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and not the Tax Section of
the ABA. Id. A contemporary commentator suggested Formal Opinion 85-352 was actually
adopted in the face of a proposal developed by the ABA Tax Section's Committee on
Standards of Tax Practice and approved by the ABA Tax Section's membership in May 1984,
which would have raised the standard to require taxpayers to take a "meritorious position."
See Falk, supra note 18, at 643-44. The Tax Section's comments on a draft of Formal Opinion
85-352 complained that the new language would fail to elevate the minimum standard and
that the proposed standard that a position be "meritorious" would have been more stringent.
Id. at 644 n.8.
97. Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 635, 636
(1986) [hereinafter Report].
98. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
99. Id. (footnote omitted). Formal Opinion 85-352 did not quantify realistic possibility
of success. However, a special task force consisting of tax luminaries later quantified this
standard as something approaching one-third. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 63-64.
100. Report, supra note 97, at 635.
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realistic possibility of success was "an objective standard which can be
enforced."10 1 In addition, the opinion stated that if the position met the
realistic possibility standard, the lawyer had no duty to require a client
to attach riders to the return.'02
While realistic possibility may have been an improvement over
reasonable basis," 3 Opinion 85-352 still suffered from the same flaws as
its predecessor opinion. Like Opinion 314, which viewed a tax return as
a submission in an adversarial proceeding and the lawyer's ethical
obligations as essentially those of an advocate, 4 Opinion 85-352
continued, and in some ways heightened, that view. 5 Opinion 85-352
notes, quite accurately, that an attorney must anticipate that a tax filing
may result in an adversarial relationship between the client and the
IRS.1 O6 However, Opinion 85-352 takes this notion a step further and
asserts that when a taxpayer takes an aggressive position, it is more
likely to result in an adversarial relationship.' 7 Thus, the reasoning of
Opinion 85-352 appeared to take the perverse position that the more
aggressive the position, the more an attorney may treat his or her role as
that of a zealous advocate.'
Opinion 85-352 also failed to take into
account the distinction the Model Rules make between lawyer as
advocate' ° and lawyer as advisor. ° While the filing of a return may
indeed be the precursor to most tax controversies, the disclosure and
self-assessment purposes of tax returns are essentially nonadversarial."'
101. Id. at 637.
102. Id. Recognizing that, despite the advice from an attorney, clients might
nevertheless be subject to penalties, the opinion suggested that "[i]n the role of advisor, the
lawyer should counsel the client as to whether the position is likely to be sustained by a court
if challenged by the IRS, as well as of the potential penalty consequences to the client if the
position is taken on the tax return without disclosure." Id.
103. It can be argued that it is practically impossible to differentiate between a ten
percent and a one-third chance of success. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64.
104. Falk, supra note 18, at 646.
105. Id. at 647. The proposed revisions to Opinion 314 explicitly rejected that
assumption. Id. The proposed revisions maintained that an adversarial proceeding began
with an audit. Id.
106. However, the low audit rates call into question what the risk actually is. As Falk
notes, because the government is not a "fairly equipped opponent," given that less than one
percent of returns will be audited, a tax return is not governed by the usual rules of
adversarial proceedings. "In this view the Service is a paper tiger, not a leviathan the
taxpayer should defeat by cunning." Id. at 647-48.
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
108. Id.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002).

111. Falk, supranote 18, at 648.
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Our voluntary tax system necessarily depends upon fair dealing with the
government. 12 Paying taxes is not a dispute with the government; it is
an obligation of citizenship." 3 "Failure to obey the law can result in an
adversarial proceeding, but obeying
the law is something one does for
14
the government, not against it." 1
Despite its shortcomings, the realistic possibility of success standard
was adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants." 5 The ABA and the AICPA also encouraged Congress to
adopt this standard for the return preparer penalty of § 6694 so that a
return preparer would not be liable for the penalty if the position on the
return had a realistic possibility of success. 116 In order to preserve some
sense of harmony between the Code and Circular 230, the Treasury
withdrew its "substantial authority" proposed regulations in Circular
230 and adopted new § 10.34 in Circular 230, which was designed to
mirror the realistic possibility standards adopted by the ABA, AICPA,
and the preparer penalty provisions of § 6694. Under § 10.34, a
practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on a return unless
the practitioner determines that there is a realistic possibility of the
position being sustained on its merits, or the position is not frivolous,
and the practitioner advises the client to adequately disclose the
position.17
"A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of
being sustained on its merits if a reasonable and wellinformed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax
law would lead such a person to conclude that the
position has approximately a one in three, or greater,
likelihood of being sustained on its merits. ' 18

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. AICPA Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 1 (1988). The AICPA
did not, however, quantify the standard as a one-third, or any other, chance of success.
116. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1396 (1989) ("The committee has adopted this new
standard because it generally reflects the professional conduct standards applicable to lawyers

and to certified public accountants.").
117. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994).
118. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(4)(i) (1994).
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The realistic possibility standard was adopted in final regulations in
1994."9 Accordingly, for non-tax shelter opinions, realistic possibility of
success became the universal standard for tax advice.
D. The Rise of Mega Tax Shelters
The realistic possibility of success standard was designed to take into
account the ambiguous nature of the tax laws and to provide an
objective standard to which lawyers could adhere. 2 ' However, the lax
one-in-three threshold attendant upon that standard also encouraged
the aggressive, pro-taxpayer side of tax lawyers. Lawyers did not need
that encouragement. As Randolph Paul noted more than half a century
ago, "The ethical problems presented to tax advisers are of a more
subtle character. Borderline questions are presented which usually have
enough potential argument in their favor to furnish some basis for
rationalization leading to a decision to act in the apparent immediate
financial interest of the taxpayer."'21 Thus, there has always been
both
22
an ethical and financial incentive to favor the client's position.'
In the 1990s, changes in the legal and accounting marketplace
magnified this issue.
Firms became more entrepreneurial, and
"consulting" became one of the largest parts of large accounting firm
practices.'23 Prior to its demise as the result of action taken on behalf of
Enron, Arthur Andersen was said to have received up to $100 million in
fees per year from Enron. 24 With larger fees, some in the millions of
dollars, the temptation to use vague and aggressive tax advice standards
became too great. 12 The combination of new vehicles in corporate
finance and the desire of public accounting firms, banks, and law firms
to generate significant revenues based on contingency or premium fees,
instead of traditional billable hours, led to new mega shelters.'26 The
hallmark of the new tax shelters was to develop a scheme, usually
119. T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 1994-2 C.B. 415 (June 20, 1994).
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
121. Paul, supra note 34, at 413; see also George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A
Tale of Tax Planning,Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1555 (1980).

122. See Paul, supra note 34, at 413.
123. This change in the industry has occurred both in the United States and
internationally. See Daniel Muzio, The Professional Project and the Contemporary ReOrganisationof the Legal Profession in England and Wales, 11 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 34
(2004).
124. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History

of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 281 n.43 (2004).
125. Id. at 282.
126. See Korb, supra note 45, at 420.
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involving numerous transactions, which involved exploiting obscure
imperfections in the tax law to produce results that "would not have
been intended if they had been foreseen, and which are likely to be
'
corrected soon after they are discovered." 27
These schemes often
involved sophisticated financial products, special-use entities, and

offshore banks not subject to U.S. taxation.'2
Some have argued that the current spate of tax shelters, while
troubling, is not necessarily new.129 Professor James S. Eustice, for one,
has dubbed current shelters as merely "old brine in new bottles."'' 3 Nor
is the view that some lawyers and accountants are not acting
appropriately new. Statements from eminent tax lawyers and scholars
at the Tax Law Review's 1952 banquet lamented the conduct of tax
lawyers of the day.131 Professor Edmond Cahn stated that lawyers "may

be fast losing our status as31 2a profession and becoming nothing more than
skilled merchant-clerks."'
While tax shelters are indeed nothing new, and the estimated current
revenue loss is not appreciably greater than in past generations of
shelters, 3 3 these Generation X shelters are nevertheless different. The
127. Id. at 421.
128. See, e.g., ACM P'ship. v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998).
129. For example, Senator Paul Douglas made the following notable statement
regarding tax loopholes (or "truck holes" as he referred to them) on the Senate floor on May
26, 1961: "These gentlemen [lawyers and accountants] help citizens to avoid and, in some
cases, to evade the payment of taxes which in all good conscience they should pay. A
bewildering variety of tax 'gimmicks' and arguments are developed with which the revenue
officials and the courts are either unable or unwilling to cope." 107 CONG. REC. 9115 (1961)
(statement of Sen. Douglas).
130. See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" In New Bottles,
55 TAx L. REV. 135, 172 (2002) ("Granting that there is a problem here-and a serious one at
that-it is not a new one. Corporate 'tax management' has been going on as long as the
corporate tax rate exceeded zero. While packaged in new and exotic wrappers, it is still the
same old, same old thing." (footnote omitted)).
131. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Opening Remarks to Ethical Problems of Tax
Practitioners, Address at the Tax Law Review's 1952 Banquet, in 8 TAx L. REV. 1, 1 (1952).
132. Id. It may be argued that lawyers have never been free from the charge that they
(we) will make any argument if the price is right. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE
MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 478-83 (2008) (quoting commentators of
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, who opined, "No one ever became an advocate, save
to deliver himself from poverty"; "Clerks go to Bologna to learn law and duplicity, and
consequently they get rich and lose their souls"; and "[D]espite lawyers' professed devotion
to justice, in reality they would take any case, no matter how flimsy, and do or say anything
for any client, no matter how wicked, provided that the client paid their fees.").
133. IRS estimates it lost $3.6 billion in 1983. See Randall Smith & Kenneth H. Bacon,
Boom in Tax Shelters Artificially Lifts Pricesof Much Real Estate, WALL ST. J.,Dec. 27, 1983,
at 1. In 2007 dollars, that amount is $7.6 billion. The IRS estimates $10 billion in losses from
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current shelters are invested in by high net-worth individuals and
corporations,3 and the magnitude of the losses claimed by each investor
in these shelters dwarfs the deductions claimed by shelter investors in
the 1970s.13 - For example, the taxpayer in ACM Partnershipclaimed a
capital loss of $84,997,111 resulting from its London Interbank Offering
Rate (LIBOR) notes transaction.1 36 By contrast, the shelters of the
1970s were invested in by thousands of individuals, including middleclass taxpayers, thereby giving those shelters an oddly democratic feel
about them.137 This demographic change has, I believe, exacerbated the
"disrespect for the tax system" that so concerns Congress.'38 Other
issues outside of the shelter industry, from the $350 billion "tax gap" to
the need for reform or repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax, have put
a premium on tax enforcement and have spurred the desire to "do
something" about the tax shelter issue.
It can also be argued that the type of advisors involved in shelters
has changed over the years. In the past, the shelter industry was
populated by professionals at the periphery of the profession.1 39 The
advisors involved in the current shelters worked for some of the most
prestigious accounting and law firms. Thus, while lawyers during the
early part of the twentieth century were the celebrities of the day,
garnering both wealth and fame, 4 ° tax lawyers and other tax
professionals in the first part of the twenty-first century have achieved a
different sort of notoriety. Arthur Andersen, the largest and oldest
tax shelters currently. Mary Williams Walsh, Treasury Department Cracks Down on Tax
Sheltersfor Firms, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at C-1. Thus, the amount of money lost, while
troubling, is not appreciably higher than in past eras.
134. While they have commonly been called corporate tax shelters, many of these
shelters were also marketed to high net-worth individuals. See Korb, supra note 45, at 420
n.1.
135. See, e.g., Glass v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986) (a consolidated case with 1400
petitioners).
136. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 1998).
137. Korb, supra note 45, at 414.
138. See generally PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS, supra note 13.

139. See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1986)
(describing "Margolis transactions" typical of shelters peddled by Harry Margolis, which were
"characterized by convoluted transfers of overvalued property rights, circular money
movements among foreign trusts, delayed drafting, signing and backdating of documents, and
client oblivion to the financial realities of their investments"); J.P. Wenchel, Discussion of the
Papers for Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners, Address at the Tax Law Review's 1952
Banquet, in 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 24 (1952) ("It is the blackleg-and he was always in the
profession. What are you going to do about him? He is on the fringe of society.").
140. See, e.g., JOHN CAMPBELL, F.E. SMITH, FIRST EARL OF BIRKENHEAD 112,113-14
(Pimlico 1983).
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international accounting firm, was indicted and, as a result, went out of
The
business due to its involvement in the tax activities of Enron.'
international accounting firm of KPMG escaped indictment only by
42
agreeing to a deferred prosecution agreement and a $450-million fine.1
Lawyers and accountants have been indicted and pleaded guilty.4 3 With
the involvement and indictment of leaders of the profession in the tax
is at least perceived to be larger and one
shelter industry, the problem
44
requiring more attention.
Others blame changes in the method of statutory interpretation for
the increase in shelter activity. Professors Noel B. Cunningham and
James R. Repetti argue that the recent proliferation of tax shelters has,
at least in part, been caused by the ascendancy of textualism or hypertextualism.' 45 They assert that tax advisors have become more
aggressive in structuring transactions that comply with the literal terms
of a statute "even though the transactions may be highly questionable in
light of the legislation's history or underlying purpose. The result has
been a cottage industry where investment banks and accounting firms
market tax shelters that triumph in form, but not substance, at the
expense of the fisc." 146

Regardless of whether the current shelters are indeed anything new,
or just "old brine in new bottles,"'' 47 the response of the government is
no doubt different. Both Congress and the Treasury have acted to
curtail tax shelters in new and sometimes troubling ways. The following
part will discuss several of the government's actions.

141. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 281.
142. Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalizationand the Need for Real
Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279,
1283 (2007).
143. See, e.g., id.; Gregory L. Diskant, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, LITIG.,
Winter 2008, at 5, 5.
144. For purposes of government regulation, perception is reality. If Congress and the
Treasury believe (as they appear to) that the newest crop of shelters is significantly worse
than previous iterations, they will take action. Moreover, Congress did in fact attack the
previous shelters with enactments in 1982 and 1986. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
145. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 2.
146. Id. (footnote omitted).
147. See Eustice, supra note 130.
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III. RECENT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

The government has, over the years, tried different tacks for
attacking shelters. In recent years, both Congress and the Treasury
have tried to define what a shelter is. As discussed more fully below,
this effort has proven unsuccessful. As a result, Congress has essentially
thrown up its hands, ceding more authority to the Treasury to decide
what an abusive shelter is, to gather information on taxpayer positions,
and to impose penalties. As I argue below, none of these efforts will
solve the tax shelter problem, and the result will, unfortunately, be
fewer taxpayers getting good, solid tax advice. In this part, I will discuss
the covered opinion rules and the amendments to the return advice
standard in both § 6694 of Title 26 of the United States Code and § 10.34
of Circular 230. I focus on these new provisions because they are
emblematic of the government's anti-shelter efforts and provide a
framework for analyzing what the government can and should do.
A. The Covered Opinion Rules

The first of the government's most recent actions was an effort to
attack tax shelters by requiring lawyers and accountants to issue
extensive, long-form opinion letters in all shelter-like transactions,
known as "covered opinions." The covered opinion rules were based on
the accurate premise that tax shelter opinions were essentially
incomplete and misleading. Many tax shelter opinions simply ignored
key facts or the implications of those facts or ignored issues entirely.
The covered opinion rules sought to rectify these problems by requiring
tax professionals to fully address all of the facts and legal issues in a tax
shelter opinion. However, the Treasury would only require these
exhaustive opinions in the case of a tax shelter, which necessarily
required the Treasury to first define a tax shelter. Unfortunately, the
definitions used in the covered opinion rules were so broad and
unworkable that these rules appeared to cover all tax advice and
negatively impacted legitimate tax advice.
1. Defining Tax Shelters
Coherently defining what constitutes a tax shelter has proven
difficult for Congress, the IRS, the courts, and academics. Arguably the
most accurate definition comes from Professor Michael Graetz, who
defined a tax shelter as "La] deal done by very smart people that, absent
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tax considerations, would be very stupid., 148 While eloquent and
perfectly descriptive, this definition is not terribly helpful in deciding
when tax planning has crossed the line into abusive tax avoidance. The
term "tax shelter" itself is defined in the Internal Revenue Code only in
§ 6662(d) and is defined as a partnership or other entity, or any
investment plan or arrangement, "if a significant purpose of such
partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of
Federal income tax." 149 While perhaps more helpful than Professor
Graetz's definition, it is still not very illuminating. Indeed, it could be
argued that a "significant purpose" of anything a tax lawyer advises a
client to do has at least as a significant purpose the avoidance of tax. "
Professor Eustice and other scholars have summarized the indicia of an
abusive tax shelter transaction."' However, these indicia are more
descriptive than definitional, and they do not purport to be a general
guide to demarcating the border between planning and abuse." 2 ABA
Formal Opinion 346 defined a tax shelter as
an investment which has as a significant feature either...
or both of the following attributes: (1) deductions in
excess of income from the investment being available in
any year to reduce income from other sources in that
year, and (2) credits in excess of the tax attributable to
the income from the investment being available in any
year to offset taxes on income from other sources in that
153
year.
148. Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax

Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al (quoting Professor Michael Graetz).
149. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Opinions on tax shelters have
always been treated differently from other tax issues. Unlike non-tax shelter opinions, which
only require a "realistic possibility of success on the merits" (a one-in-three chance) or
"substantial authority" (somewhere between one in three and fifty percent), tax shelter
opinions require the practitioner to determine that the issue is "more likely than not" to
succeed on the merits if challenged. The more likely than not standard is defined as greater
than a fifty percent chance of success. See supra Part II.
150. Schler, supra note 1, at 329.
151. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 130, at 158-59; see also Korb, supra note 45, at 421. In
Part III.D infra, I will discuss other proposals by scholars to resolve the current tax shelter
problem.
152. Nevertheless, Congress and the Treasury have used some of these indicia in
defining what is a "reportable transaction," which would require taxpayers to disclose
investments in transactions that possess these indicia. See 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (2000 & Supp. V

2005). Again, what constitutes a "reportable transaction" was never intended to provide a
global definition of what constitutes a tax shelter.
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 n.1 (1982).

2008]

"PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM" AND TAX SHEL TERS

59

targeted definition of tax shelters and
This too appeared to be a rather
15 4
definition.
shelter
general
a
not
2. Covered Opinions
With this history in mind, the Treasury took its shot at defining (and
deterring) abusive shelters when it amended Circular 230 and adopted
the covered opinion rules.' 55 Under the rules that became effective in
June 2005,156 if a tax practitioner provides written advice on certain
types of investments, 157 defined as a "covered opinion," the advice must
be given in the form of a "covered opinion" consistent with the rules of
§ 10.35.158 Thus, both the type of investment and the type of opinion
letter required were referred to as covered opinions. 9 As set forth
below, the type of investment that constitutes a covered opinion (read
tax shelter) is far from clear under the regulations. Moreover, the
requirements that must be followed in drafting a covered opinion are
detailed, time-consuming, and expensive for clients.'60 However, if the
written communication does concern a covered opinion and the
practitioner does not satisfy all of the covered opinion requirements of
§ 10.35, the practitioner can face disciplinary action by the Treasury."'
As a result, practitioners were loathe to provide any advice and
defaulted to a strategy of "legending out" of the covered opinion rules
by attaching disclaimers denying penalty protection for their clients.'62
Under the regulations, a "covered opinion" is any written
communication, including emails, letters, and memoranda, that give
advice on any tax issue as long as the opinion concerns one of three
154. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., ABA Formal Opinion 346 and a New Statutory Penalty
Regime, 111 TAX NOTES 1269, 1270 (2006).
155. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2005).
156. The final regulations effective May 19, 2005, came after several sets of proposed
regulations and amendments. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824 (May 19, 2005); 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839
(Dec. 20, 2004).
157. The covered opinion rules echo the language of § 6662(d) and use the phrase "a
partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or other plan or
arrangement." 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10). Throughout this discussion, I will use the word
"investment" to cover this more latitudinous definition. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 &
Supp. V 2005).
158. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c) (2005).
159. This redundant use of the term "covered opinion" contributed to the confusion
surrounding the requirements of § 10.35.
160. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(d) (2005).
161. 31 C.F.R. § 10.60 (2005).
162. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005).
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types of investment. 63 The first type of investment is so-called listed
transactions. 6" Listed transactions are investments or schemes that the
Treasury has specifically listed in public announcements as being
abusive tax shelters. 165 If the investment is, or is substantially similar to
a listed transaction, a covered opinion must be issued."
The second type of investment is one that has as its "principal
purpose" the avoidance or evasion of any tax (not just income taxes)
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code.' 67 For purposes of the covered
opinion rules, the principal purpose of an investment is the avoidance or
evasion of any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code "if that
purpose exceeds any other purpose."' Commentators were concerned
about the broad definition of "principal purpose"'69 and the difficulty a
practitioner would have in determining whether a client's purpose in
investing in an entity involved primarily tax avoidance or some other
purpose. In addition, many practitioners rightly expressed concern that
some investments have as their principal purpose the avoidance of
federal tax and are yet perfectly acceptable under the Code. For
example, family limited partnerships, where one of the main reasons for
such investment plans is the avoidance of federal estate tax, could be a
covered opinion. 70
Likewise an S corporation, arguably the sole
purpose of which is to avoid corporate level tax and/or self-employment
taxes, would also be a covered opinion. 7 ' Commentators wondered
whether every piece of written advice recommending the use of an S
corporation must be made via a long-form covered opinion.'
When the final regulations were adopted, the "principal purpose"
definition was limited to provide that the principal purpose of an
investment is not to avoid or evade federal tax if that investment "has as
its purpose the claiming of tax benefits in a manner consistent with the
statute and Congressional purpose.' ' 173 This language resolved the

163. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2) (2005).

164. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(A) (2005).
165. Listed transactions are a subset of reportable transactions under 26 U.S.C. § 6111
(2000 & Supp. V 2006); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6707A (West 2007); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2008).
166. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).
167. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(B) (2005).
168. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2005).
169. Id.; see T.D. 9201, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824, 28,825 (May 19, 2005).
170. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10).
171. Id.
172. See T.D. 9201, 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,825.
173. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10).
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thorny issue raised by the commentators and, by doing so, the Treasury
acknowledged that some tax planning, and indeed some "tax shelters,"
are acceptable under current law."7
The third type of investment is one in which a "significant purpose"
is the avoidance or evasion of any federal tax. 75' Standing alone, this
definition would cover any advice given by a tax practitioner. This
broad definition is limited by the qualifiers that the written advice be
either (1) a "reliance opinion,"' 76 (2) a "marketed opinion,"'77 (3)
"subject to conditions of confidentiality,"' 7 8 or (4) subject to
"contractual protection."'7 9 Because typical tax advice does not involve
marketed opinions or opinions subject to contractual protection or

confidentiality requirements,'80 the most important qualifier concerns
reliance opinions.
Unlike the other covered opinion definitions, in which the
definitions are based on the kind of investment the taxpayer is seeking
advice on, a reliance opinion is determined by the level of certainty
reached in the opinion.'
A reliance opinion is any written advice "if
the advice concludes at a confidence level of at least more likely than
not (a greater than 50 percent likelihood) that one or more significant
82
Federal tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer's favor.'
Conversely, a written communication or email will not be treated as a
reliance opinion "if the practitioner prominently discloses in the written
advice that it was not intended or written by the practitioner to be used,
174. I will return to the limiting language, "consistent with the statute and Congressional
purpose," in the discussion of a workable standard for tax advice.
175. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C) (2005).
176. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(1) (2005) (emphasis omitted).
177. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(2) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (an opinion that is used by
promoters to market a particular investment plan, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(i) (2005)).
178. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(3) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (the taxpayer can only
learn of the investment if he or she promises not to disclose the terms of the plan, 31 C.F.R. §
10.35(b)(6) (2005)).
179. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(4) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (the taxpayer may obtain a
refund of fees paid to the professional should the IRS challenge the plan and the taxpayer has
to repay the tax benefits, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(7) (2005)).
180. Many "modern" tax shelters had as one of their characteristics that they were
marketed to many potential "investors," that they offered protection to the investor in the
form of contractual protection, or that they would only be disclosed to potential investors on
the condition that the investor/target agreed not to disclose the details of the investment. See,
e.g., Korb, supra note 45, at 421. Given that these types of investments or plans were more
typical of tax shelters, making advice regarding these investments more difficult does not
impede legitimate tax advice.
181. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i) (2005).
182. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:33

and that it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding
'
This dichotomy left
penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer."183
many practitioners with the impression that all tax advice, including
emails, was required either to be in the form of a covered opinion or
contain a no-reliance disclaimer.'84 This impression was reinforced by
an unrelated section of the covered opinion rules requiring that if an
opinion does not reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at least
more likely than not, the opinion must contain the no-reliance
disclaimer. 185
However, a close reading of the reliance opinion rule shows that
written advice will be a reliance opinion (and therefore a covered
opinion) only if the practitioner reaches a more likely than not
opinion.18 6 If a practitioner reaches a conclusion at a confidence level
less than more likely than not, it is not a covered opinion.'87 Nothing
prevented a practitioner from giving a favorable opinion at less than the
more likely than not opinion standard, and clients could rely on that
advice and obtain protection from penalties in most cases. 8 8 Moreover,
while the seemingly categorical statement of subsection (e)(4) that all
opinions that do not reach a more likely than not conclusion must
include a no-penalty disclaimer, a closer reading of this provision shows
this is not the case.' 89 Clause (4) is part of subsection (e), which begins:
"A covered opinion must contain all of the following disclosures that
apply."'" Since an opinion given at less than a more likely than not
level is not a covered opinion, a no-reliance disclaimer is not required.'
Despite the limited coverage of the reliance opinions, given the
ambiguity of the regulations and the possibility of sanctions for failure
to follow the covered opinion rules, practitioners determined that

183. 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005).

184. And a number of articles have contributed to this misunderstanding. See, e.g., Dan
W. Holbrook, Where There's a Will: Revenge of the IRS: Circular230 Changes Law Practice,
41 TENN. B.J. 28, 30 (2005); Scott E. Vincent, New IRS Tax Shelter Rules May Require

Disclosuresfor Broadly Defined "Tax Advice," 61 J. Mo. B. 213,213 (2005).
185. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e)( 4 ) (2005).
186. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4) (2005).

187. Id.
188. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6664 (West 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2008). But see 26
U.S.C. 6694(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing penalties for understatements due to unreasonable
positions). In addition, as is discussed in the next part, providing an opinion below the more
likely than not standard may now require disclosure of the position on the return.
189. See 31 C.F.R. § 1035(e)(4).
190. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e) (2005) (emphasis added).
191. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C) (2005); 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(4) (2005).
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discretion-and disclaimers-were the better part of valor. It has
therefore become standard practice for most firms that give tax advice
to include in every email or written product, even routine, non-tax
related communications with clients or other lawyers, language to the
effect that "this communication may not be relied upon for penalty
protection." The ubiquitous nature of the penalty-protection disclaimer
soon lowered the disclaimers to a farcical level, with one internet vendor
marketing coffee mugs, t-shirts, and even underwear emblazoned with
the no-penalty-protection mantra. 92
The result of the covered opinion rules was that practitioners
became more careful and parsimonious with their tax advice. While the
covered opinion rules can be parsed with some effort, the breadth and
coverage of these rules are still far from clear in many cases. Moreover,
the provisions are unacceptably complex with numerous defined terms
and overlapping standards and definitions.193 The standard for giving
tax advice simply cannot consist of numerous pages of dense text-such
a standard is completely unworkable. 94 Tax lawyers and accountants
cannot be spending more time trying to figure out what the tax advice
standard means than applying it to provide tax advice. The truly bad
actors who do not care about real tax advice will still peddle abusive
transactions, and there is little to be gained by an unadvised taxpayer
community. 95' As Mark Johnson argued:
If he [the average taxpayer] can receive expert advice
which he trusts, he will follow that advice. If he does not,
he will use a do-it-yourself kit of his own. It is this latter
prospect at which we should all shudder-not as tax
experts who will be done out of fees, but as citizens

192. Caf6 Press, http://shop.cafepress.com/no-penalty (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
193. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35.
194. In addition to being bad policy, the covered opinion rules may also be
unconstitutional. See David T. Moldenhauer, Circular230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics
and First Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of ProfessionalSpeech By Lawyers, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 844 (2006).
195. See Freedman, supra note 43, at 346 n.68.
"It is important not to make life more difficult for the compliant, but to

concentrate regulatory resources on the non-compliant. If the uncertainty
at the borderline affects those who wish to comply it will be unacceptable
but if it simply makes it difficult for those who wish to manipulate the

rules then it may be acceptable."
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facing the breakdown of our voluntary compliance
system. It is vital for us to distinguish between tax
avoidance under a system of respectable expert advice,
and the wholesale tax evasion which would be
accomplished by a skeptical and unadvised citizenry.
Right now, all the highly publicized tax avoidance
gadgets amount to a narrow strip of gray between the
accepted blacks and whites of the law. That small
blemish on the purity of our tax structure is indeed a
slight price to pay for keeping the black and the white as
separate as they are; the alternative could be one large
smudge of dirty gray."'
B. Revised Opinion Standards: More Likely Than Not
The other major course of action, presumably undertaken to
improve tax advisors' ethics and deter tax shelters, 97 was the
amendment of the tax preparer penalties. As discussed at length
above,' the general standard applicable to tax advice since the mid-

1980s has been the realistic possibility of success standard."9

That

standard was enforced in part by § 6694, which imposes penalties against
tax return preparers who give tax advice that falls below the realistic
possibility standard.2 °° Indeed, it was after the adoption of this standard

in § 6694 that the Treasury embraced the realistic possibility standard as
the general standard for tax advice in § 10.34 of Circular 230. Congress
and the Treasury substantially altered that standard with the
amendment of § 6694 by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax
Act of 2007 and the Treasury's proposed changes to § 10.34 of Circular

230.21
196. Johnson, supra note 37, at 30; see also Thomas J. Graves, Responsibility of the Tax
Adviser, 114 J. ACC'Y No. 6, 33, 35 (1962) ("Certainly a well-advised taxpayer is more likely
to observe good standards than one who is ill-advised and, being uninformed, feels himself
free to take refuge in his own subjective views of what the law might be.").
197. I use the word "presumably" because there is no indication in the legislative history
as to why Congress enacted the revisions to 26 U.S.C. § 6694. See STAFF OF J.COMM. ON
TAXATION, 110TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "SMALL BUSINESS AND
WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX ACT OF 2007" AND PENSION RELATED PROVISIONS CONTAINED

IN H.R. 2206, at 34 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R.
2206]. One can only presume that it was undertaken to improve practitioner conduct.
Whether it will have this beneficial effect remains to be seen.
198. See supra Part II.
199. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007).
200. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2000).
201. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121

2008]

"PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM" AND TAX SHELTERS

Prior to its amendment in 2007, the penalty under § 6694(a) applied
to any income tax return preparer 212 if (1) any part of an understatement
of liability was due to a position for which there was not a realistic
possibility of being sustained on its merits; (2) the return preparer knew
or reasonably should have known of such position; and (3) the position
was not disclosed or was frivolous.2"3 Thus, for purposes of § 6694, as
long as the position met the realistic possibility of success standard, the
penalty was not applicable." °4
As amended, § 6694(a) broadened the application of the penalty
from "income tax return preparers" to "[a]ny tax return preparer,"
205
including preparers of estate tax, gift tax, and employment tax returns.
The amendments also increased the amount of the penalty from a
relatively modest $250 per return to the greater of $1,000 or fifty percent
of the income derived or to be derived by the practitioner."' With fees
for tax advice routinely in the thousands, if not hundreds of thousands
of dollars, this penalty could be substantial indeed. 27 The revised
penalty would apply if (1) the preparer knew or should have known of
the position; (2) the position did not meet the more likely than not
standard; and (3) the position was not disclosed or there was no
reasonable basis for the position.
This revision to the penalties applicable to return advice was not
proposed by the Treasury or the IRS. In fact, the Chief Counsel of the
IRS admitted that the Treasury was "blindsided" by the amendments.
Moreover, the amendments originated not in the Senate Finance
Stat. 190 (2007); Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 72
Fed. Reg. 54,621 (Sept. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
202. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(a)(36) (West 2007) (defining income tax return preparer).
Moreover, the realistic possibility of success standard in Circular 230 was adopted by the
Treasury in response to the amendment of § 6694 in 1986 and that section's use of the realistic
possibility of success standard. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified
Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (June 20, 1994).
203. 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2000).
204. As discussed above, the Treasury's adoption of the realistic possibility standard as
part of Circular 230 in 1994 was in reaction to Congress's enactment of § 6694 and its realistic
possibility standard. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
205. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. Given the ambiguity of the more likely than not standard, these penalties threaten
the righteous as well as the evil (in fact, they are probably more of a threat to the righteous).
208. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a)(2) (West 2007).
209. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, Government Officials Discuss Partnership,Shelter
Issues, TAX ANALYSTS, June 4, 2007.
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Committee nor in the House Ways and Means Committee, but rather in
the House Rules Committee, and there is little legislative history on this
portion of the Act.210 In part because of this dubious lineage, the
implications of these amendments were not fully vetted, and the
amendments
created several implementation problems for the
Treasury.2'211
C. Problems FittingIn
The first change wrought by the § 6694 amendments, and one of the
most necessary, was the Treasury's proposed regulations amending the
general standard providing tax advice under Circular 230.212
As
discussed above, under § 10.34 of Circular 230, a practitioner could
advise a client to take a position on a return as long as the position had a
210. The only legislative material on this portion of the Act is the Joint Committee's
Technical Explanation of the "Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007" and
Pension Related Provisions Contained in H.R. 2206. That report provides as follows:
The provision also alters the standards of conduct that must be met
to avoid imposition of the penalties for preparing a return with respect to
which there is an understatement of tax. First, the provision replaces the
realistic possibility standard for undisclosed positions with a requirement
that there be a reasonable belief that the tax treatment of the position was
more likely than not the proper treatment. The provision replaces the notfrivolous standard accompanied by disclosure with the requirement that
there be a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of the position
accompanied by disclosure.
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2206, supra note 197, at 34.
211. In addition to dealing with the implementation problems, the Treasury attempted
to shape the meaning of the amendments by putting its own spin on what § 6694 provides. A
close reading of the 2007 amendments to § 6694 shows that a return preparer will be liable for
the penalty only if (1) the preparer knew or reasonably should have known of the position;
(2) the position did not meet the more likely than not standard; and (3) the position was not
disclosed or there was no reasonable basis for the position. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a). Thus, as
drafted, as long as there was a reasonable basis for the position, whether disclosed or not, the
penalty should not apply. Id. The Treasury was clearly troubled by the literal terms of the
statute, since the penalty would not apply, regardless of disclosure or the position met the
more likely than not standard. Id. Hence, the amendments would lower, not raise, the
standard applicable to tax advice. One IRS employee told me that, in his opinion, Congress
could have been "a little clearer" in its wording of § 6694(a). In an effort to effect what it
believes the intent of Congress to be, the Treasury issued Notice 2007-54, in which the
Treasury interprets § 6694 to read that the penalty will be applicable if the position was not
disclosed and there was no reasonable basis for the position. I.R.S. Notice 2007-54, 2007-27
I.R.B. 1, 12. This interpretation appears to be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
212. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007). As discussed, supra note 201 and accompanying text, the
Treasury initially employed the realistic possibility of success standard in Circular 230 in
response to the inclusion of that standard in the § 6694 penalties in 1994. With the 2007
amendments to § 6694, the Treasury now feels free to revise the Circular 230 standards.
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realistic possibility of success on the merits. Obviously, that standard
had to be changed to resolve the conflict between amended § 6694 and
§ 10.34. Under the revised version of § 10.34, a practitioner may not
advise a client to take a position on a tax return, or prepare the portion
of a tax return on which a position is taken, unless (1) the practitioner
has a reasonable belief that the position satisfies the more likely than
not standard; or (2) the position has a reasonable basis and is adequately
disclosed.213 The proposed amendments thus revise § 10.34 to conform
to amended § 6694 (or at least the Treasury's interpretation of § 6694),
and more likely than not (i.e., a greater than fifty-percent chance of
success).

Unfortunately, the amendments to § 10.34 create their own
downstream problems as well. For example, the revision to § 10.34 may
require the Treasury to revisit the covered opinion rules-more
specifically, the rules applicable to reliance opinions. As discussed
above, advice is a reliance opinion-and therefore a covered opiniononly if the practitioner opines that the position has a more likely than
not chance of success. 4 With the amendments to § 6694, a practitioner
would face penalties of up to fifty percent of the fees earned unless he or
she issued a more likely than not opinion or the position was
disclosed. 215 As a result, unless the covered opinion rules are modified,
it appears that all written tax advice will either have to be in the form of
a covered opinion or contain the no-reliance disclaimer, or the position
with respect to that advice will have to be disclosed on the return. This
makes the reliance opinion standard nearly superfluous.
Second, the Treasury has issued interim guidance and proposed
regulations designed to deal with what it has termed "the complexities
and anomalies" resulting from the inconsistent treatment of return
preparers under the § 6694 amendments and of taxpayers under the
accuracy-related penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers, as well as
the inconsistencies between the § 6694 amendments and Circular 230.216
For example, the 2007 amendments to § 6694 provide, in essence, that a
practitioner may not advise a taxpayer to take a position on a return
213. 72 Fed. Reg. 54,621, 54,622 (Sept. 26, 2007).
214. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4) (2007).
215. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121
Stat. 203 (2007).
216. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282. In addition to Notice 2008-13, the
Treasury has issued Notice 2007-54, Notice 2008-11, and Notice 2008-14, and on June 17,
2008, issued proposed regulations under § 6694 and § 7701. Tax Return Preparer Penalties
Under Sections 6694 and 6695, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560 (June 17, 2008).
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unless the position has a more likely than not chance of success or the
position is disclosed to the IRS. However, under § 6662(d), a taxpayer
may take a position on a return without disclosure as long as the
position meets the lower standard of "substantial authority., 217 Thus, as
a result of the amendments to § 6694, tax practitioners were subject to a
higher standard than their clients. Given these divergent standards,
what may the practitioner advise his or her client? Should the
practitioner advise: "There is something called substantial authority but
I cannot advise you take a position that meets that standard."? The
differing standards between advisor and client, and the real possibility
that the advisor could face substantial penalties, thus created a conflict
of interest between advisors and their clients.
The Treasury recognized this problem and essentially declined to
enforce certain provisions of amended § 6694. Under the proposed
18
regulations, a return preparer may advise a client to take a position on
a return even though the return preparer does not have a reasonable
belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the
merits, as long as the position has a reasonable basis and the position is
"disclosed" in one of the following ways: (1) the position is actually
disclosed on the return or on a properly completed Form 8275; (2) the
return preparer provides the client with the prepared tax return that
includes the disclosure statement; or (3) if the position meets the
substantial authority standard (and therefore the client is not required
to disclose the position), the return preparer "advises the taxpayer of all
the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662.219
Thus, while Congress mandated in its 2007 amendments to § 6694 that a
position on a return either meet the more likely than not standard or the
position is required to be disclosed on the return,2 the Treasury will not
217. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
218. Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 and 6695, 73 Fed. Reg. at
34,562.
219. Id. at 34,565. The return preparer must also contemporaneously document the
advice in the tax return preparer's files. Id. at 34,566. In addition, return preparers may
satisfy the disclosure requirement in the case of a tax shelter or reportable transaction, as
defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) or 26 U.S.C. § 6662A (Supp. IV
2004), if the return preparer advises the taxpayer that there must be, at a minimum,
substantial authority for the position, that the taxpayer must possess a reasonable belief that
the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment in order to avoid a penalty
under § 6662(d) or § 6662A as applicable, and that disclosure will not protect the taxpayer
from assessment of an accuracy-related penalty if either § 6662(d)(2)(C) or § 6662A applies
to the position. Id.
220. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a)(2)(C)(i) (West 2007) provides that the penalty will be
imposed if "the position was not disclosed as provided in § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)," which requires
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impose the penalty against tax professionals as long as they advise their
clients on the ways to comply with the substantial authority standard.
Moreover, the requirement of § 6694 that the position must be disclosed
may be satisfied by the return preparer "disclosing" to the client (and
not the IRS). 22' The net effect of these rules is that, contrary to the
explicit intent of revised § 6694, the substantial authority standard
appears to be the standard applicable to tax professionals. 22 Congress
has apparently recognized the problems with its amendments to § 6694
and, in the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of
2008,223 modified the penalty standards yet again. Under the most
recent version of § 6694,2 a return preparer will not be liable for the
penalty if there is substantial authority for the position or the position
has a reasonable basis and is disclosed. 225 Thus, the amendments appear
26
to be consistent with Treasury's position in the proposed regulations.
D. More FundamentalIssues
While averting a conflict between the standards of more likely than
not and substantial authority, the IRS Notices and proposed regulations
underscore, but do not resolve, the two largest problems with the
amendments to § 6694 and the proposed revisions of § 10.34: the
shortcomings of the more likely than not standard and the problems
attendant to disclosure.
1. More Likely Than Not, Not to Work
While it is an improvement over the realistic possibility and
reasonable basis standards, the more likely than not standard suffers
from the same fundamental flaw as its predecessors. Basing opinion

disclosure to the IRS on the face of the return or on a statement or form attached to the
return. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
221. Lee A. Sheppard, Diluting the Preparer Penalties by Regulation, 118 TAX NOTES
1213, 1216-17 (2008).
222. See id. at 1216.
223. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). The Tax Extenders and Alternative
Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, along with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 and the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, was part of the massive
financial bailout bill quickly passed by Congress in October 2008.
224. The amendments generally apply to returns prepared after May 25, 2007. Id. §
506(b).
225. Id. § 506(a). The more likely than not standard continues to apply to tax shelters.
Id.
226. Given that these amendments to § 6694 occurred during the final production of this
Article, a full analysis of these amendments is not possible.
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standards on a "chance of success" should a matter be litigated is in
many, if not most, cases an exceedingly difficult determination,
particularly in cases where the law is new or developing. More
troubling, it takes the focus off what I believe the real question tax
advisors should be giving advice on-what does the law provide?
Making a prediction on a chance of success in tax law is fraught with
difficulties. First, by looking at the chance of success should the matter
be litigated, the focus is necessarily directed toward a hypothetical
event, judicial review, which often has yet to occur.227 Yet, in making
this determination, the tax advisor may not take into account that the
matter may not be subject to audit. 28 Given the low audit rates, the
determination of success if the matter is litigated is necessarily specious,
which plays into the cost-benefit analysis of, if not advisors, then
certainly taxpayers.229 Moreover, as Professor Sarah Lawsky points out,
a percentage chance of success, whether it be one in three or greater
than fifty percent, cannot be determined based on the frequency with
which it has succeeded.23 The standard is thus inherently disingenuous.
For example, if a circuit court in the taxpayer's jurisdiction has upheld a
position, then even if the numerous district court opinions in that circuit
struck it down, the position is "correct" in that circuit. Thus, the more
likely than not calculation cannot be made based solely on the number
of times a position has succeeded or failed in litigation.
In calculating the frequency with which a position is upheld, an
advisor must also determine the cases with which the matter at issue
should be compared. This requires an advisor to determine whether the
position in question is "like" another position, which can be troubling
given that the decisions on any tax issue tend to be highly fact-specific.
Thus, knowing that five out of ten "similar" positions have been upheld
does not tell us that there is a fifty-percent chance that this particular
position will be upheld, nor that if the court looks at all ten of the
positions on the taxpayer's return, it will find that five of them are
correct."' Most of the case law on gray-area tax issues provides at best
only anecdotal evidence of how a court might rule and provides no real
basis for an advisor to determine a chance of success. The old saw that

227. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U.

PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19, on file with author).
228.
229.
230.
231.

31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d)(1) (2007).
Lawsky, supra note 227, at 13-14.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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"the plural of anecdote is not data" is especially apt here. 23 2 In addition,
the quality of the lawyering or whether the case was handled pro se in
the Tax Court could well have impacted the court's decision, or the
court's decision might be so fundamentally flawed as to be objectively
"wrong. , 23' Thus, the fact that a court ruled against the position at issue
may well not be the end of the inquiry. Furthermore, with many newly
concocted tax shelters, as well as legitimate but cutting-edge tax
questions, neither the specific issue nor any issue similar to it may ever
have been ruled on by a court. Thus, there would be no data, or even an
anecdote, for an advisor to consider in determining a chance of success
from a predictive perspective.
The Treasury appears to be fully aware of the limitations of basing
opinion standards on the chance of success, especially in relatively new
areas of the law. The proposed regulations under § 6694 provide that a
"tax return preparer may reasonably believe that a position more likely
than not would be sustained on its merits despite the absence of other
types of authority if the position is supported by a well-reasoned
construction of the applicable statutory provision. 23 4 The Treasury has
thus acknowledged that there will be cases in which an advisor cannot
practicably determine whether a position meets a certain chance of
success based on a comparison of existing authorities, but will instead
base his or her opinion on an interpretation of the statute. Professor
Lawsky refers to this as a subjectivist interpretation of probability.235
Under this approach, the focus is not on the chance of success from a
numerical point of view, but on the advisor's degree of belief in the
236
position.
Thus, while still focusing on a chance of success, the
subjectivist interpretation acknowledged in the Treasury's position in
section 1.6694-2(b)(1) moves the inquiry away from what a court might
decide based on a historical inquiry and closer to a focus on the rules
themselves and the lawyer's opinion with respect to those rules.237
232. See, e.g., Edith Greene, A Love-Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 99, 100 (1995)
(book review) (emphasis omitted).

233. See Rowen, supra note 82, at 243.
234. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008); see
also I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, supra note 216, at 286 ex. 10.
235. Lawsky, supra note 227, at 10-11.
236. Id.
237. It should be noted that the quoted portion of section 1.6694-2(b)(1) is only one

sentence in a thirty-page set of regulations. Other parts of the proposed regulations employ a
decidedly frequentist or numerical interpretation of probability. See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-2(b)(4) ex. 4, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008). Thus, it cannot be said that

the Treasury has abandoned a numerical or frequentist approach to these questions.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:33

This distinction was made by H.L.A. Hart, who provided a useful
analogy in demonstrating the pitfalls of the predictive theory of law, i.e.,
"the law ... is what the courts say it is." 238 Hart analogizes the law and
judges' role in the law to a game of cricket or baseball played first
without, and then with, an official scorer. 239 Prior to the use of the
scorer, the players all agree to the rules and more or less abide by those
rules in resolving any disputes.24 ° When an official scorer is inserted into
the game, the scorer's decision is the final word on the application of the
rules.2 41 Players can predict what the scorer will do in a given situation,
but these are merely unofficial statements as to what the scorer will
officially decide.24 2 The players can predict what the scorer's ruling will
be because they know and have used the rules, and because the scorer
will, in the vast majority of the cases, follow the rules.243 While the
scorer could in theory make any ruling he or she wished, if the rules are
disregarded too frequently, the game ceases to be cricket or baseball
and becomes the game of "scorer's discretion. 244 Applying this analogy
to law, judges have considerably more discretion than official scorers in
a game, but they nevertheless are bound by laws, constitutions, and
rules. 245' Hart argues:
Such standards could not indeed continue to exist unless
most of the judges of the time adhered to them, for their
existence at any given time consists simply in the
acceptance and use of them as standards of correct
adjudication. But this does not make the judge who uses
them the author of these standards ....
238. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (2d ed. 1994). Falk noted his criticism
of the realistic possibility of success standard when it was adopted in 1985:
Legal realism-at least in the crude predictive version espoused by
Holmes, Gray, Llewellyn, and Hughes-is the position that law is
whatever a judge says it is. As a general theory of law, this predictive
version of legal realism has been thoroughly discredited for over a
generation. Yet Opinion 352 defines the term "good faith" in terms of this
crude legal realism-i.e., the predicted result of adjudication.
Falk, supra note 18, at 653-54 (footnotes omitted).
239. HART, supra note 238, at 142.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 143.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 142.
245. Id. at 145.
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...[P]redictions of what a court will do are like the
prediction we might make that chess-players will move
the bishop diagonally: they rest ultimately on an
appreciation of the non-predictive aspect of rules, and of
the internal point of view of the rules as standards
accepted by those to whom the predictions relate.246
In determining whether a position on a tax return meets the more
likely than not standard, advisors are asked to predict how a court will
ultimately rule. Thus, it is the rule, not what the judge determines it to
be, that should be controlling. As Theodore Falk noted in his criticism
of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352: "Whether one can in good faith
believe in the lawfulness of a position is not the same as predicting that
the courts24will
adopt it. Rather, a position is lawful if the courts ought to
7
adopt it.
Moreover, for purposes of taxpayers' reliance defense, it is the mere
saying of the phrase "more likely than not" by the tax professional that
makes it so. If a lawyer or accountant advises a taxpayer that a position
has a more likely than not chance of success, then, at least as to that
taxpayer and that tax position, the position does meet that standard,
since taxpayers are generally allowed to rely on the advice of tax
experts. 4R While predicting whether something has a certain chance of
success is in most cases difficult if not impossible to calculate, by the
same token, proving that a position does not meet that chance of success
standard is equally difficult to prove, especially in the context of
negligence penalties. Thus, under the predictive standards as applied to
tax law, the more likely than not standard turns legal realism on its head
by making the law what the lawyer says it is, since, for purposes of the
reliance defense, the lawyer's determination that a position meets the
more likely than not standard makes it so. Accordingly, basing the
standard for tax advice on a chance of success is both unrealistic and
ripe for abuse. The standard should be based on what the lawyer
believes the law is. Focusing on the law itself, rather than on some

246. Id. at 145, 147.
247. Falk, supra note 18, at 655. According to Falk, the purpose of the standard should
be to "improve lawyers' arguments, not their footnotes." Id. at 657.
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2007).
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mythical chance of success, more properly emphasizes the role of tax
advisors and puts the responsibility squarely on advisors' shoulders.
2. Disclosure
The second fundamental problem with the new tax advice rules is
related to the issues of disclosure. Those return positions that do not
meet, or cannot definitively be said to have met, either the more likely
than not standard or the substantial authority standard must be
disclosed. Notice 2008-14 outlines the nuts-and-bolts procedures for
how a taxpayer is to disclose a position. However, neither the Notice
nor any other guidance informs taxpayers or their advisors as to how
much information must be disclosed for it to be a sufficient disclosure to
avoid penalties.249 A simple example might prove useful: Suppose you
are advising clients, Dr. and Dr. Smith, who are both physicians. In
addition to their downtown condo, the Smiths own a pied-de-terre to
which they repair each weekend. They raise and train horses on the
farm, and their plan is to sell horses at some point and make a profit.
This year, as with each year in the past, the farm has lost money. The
Smiths would like to claim an ordinary business loss deduction on their
Form 1040 for the farm and ask your advice. During the course of the
many conversations you have had with the Smiths, you learn that they
have three teenage daughters, each of whom is crazy about horses and
riding. While the clients hope to sell the horses they are raising, their
daughters are resisting any effort to sell "their pets."
This, of course, is the classic hobby loss scenario. Given the law in
this area, it would be difficult to determine that the Smiths have a more
likely than not chance of succeeding on the hobby loss issue, and a
disclosure would be necessary.250 If they claim a loss from the horse
farm, what must be disclosed in order for the disclosure to be sufficient?
Must the taxpayers disclose that it is a potential hobby loss, that their
children ride the horses, that the farm has lost money each year, or that
their daughters consider the horses to be pets and not inventory? Those
taxpayers and their advisors who want to make adequate disclosures but

249. For example, Treasury Regulation section 1.6662-4(f)(1) merely provides:
"Disclosure is adequate with respect to an item ... if the disclosure is made on a properly
completed form attached to the return .... " The regulations do not define or explain what
amount of disclosure is "adequate." Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(0(1) (2007). The Revenue
Procedures in this area suffer from the same lack of specificity. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2001-52,
2001-46 I.R.B. 491.
250. See, e.g., Osteen v. Comm'r, 62 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1995).
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not raise unnecessary red flags are given little guidance in the new
disclose-everything regime.
Beyond the practical difficulties with disclosure for those taxpayers
and their advisors who want to make sufficient disclosure, there is also a
risk that the disclosure regime will become the refuge of the knaves and
villains much in the way the tax shelter opinion itself was in the 1990s.
First, for those members of the tax bar who wish to conceal their
knavery, the disclosure statement will permit them to act as if they are
complying, but without providing truly helpful information."' The
carefully-worded-but-eminently-misleading disclosure statement will
therefore become more about deceiving the IRS than actually disclosing
anything. The other risk is that the new strategy will be to disclose
everything regardless of whether the position is settled or not. In some
cases, over-disclosure will be made out of an excess of caution, and there
is little to be lost in disclosing transactions that the IRS will ultimately
bless.2 52 But the bar is also capable of flooding the government with
paper, thereby making it all the more difficult for the government to
find the truly useful disclosure. As Professor David Schizer noted,
"[t]here is no penalty .

.

. for adding hay to the haystack, in order to

'
make the needle harder to find."253
With already low audit rates, the
IRS simply does not have the staffing to deal with the torrent of
disclosure statements that may occur. 254
Moreover, as Professor Boris Bittker noted a generation ago,
Congress should not fall back on the requirement of disclosure to
resolve the ambiguities inherent in the tax code. 25' The IRS is fully
capable, given its blanket authority to prescribe the forms taxpayers
must use, of specifying the items that are frequently debatable, and "the
Internal Revenue Service ought not to depend on a vague concept of
taxpayer disclosure for debatable items and transactions., 256 The
Treasury has lessened the impact of Congress's disclosure mandate in
the proposed regulations under § 6694 by allowing, in essence,
disclosure to the client. However, it is unclear whether Congress will

251. Schizer, supra note 8, at 369.
252. Overreaction by the tax bar was indeed the response to the covered opinion rules.
See supra text accompanying notes 160-62.
253. Schizer, supra note 8, at 370.
254. See id. at 331-32.
255. Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility and Federal Tax Practice, reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 233, 255 (Boris Bittker ed.,
1970).
256. Id.
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permit this emasculating of the preparer penalties to stand, and also
whether Congress will insist on full disclosure to the IRS of questionable
257
positions.
Finally, if disclosure does become the new default position for
taxpayers and their advisors, this propensity to disclose could have
serious implications for the attorney-client privilege in tax advice. The
reach and contours of the attorney-client privilege in tax matters is
murky at best, with some courts holding that return advice is not subject
to the privilege.258 What is evident, however, is that when a position is
disclosed on a return, the privilege is waived. 2" Thus, by establishing a
system in which disclosure is more or less compelled, Congress and the
Treasury are essentially requiring taxpayers to waive the attorney-client
privilege in many instances. While I do not believe Congress's nudging
toward more disclosure is part of a concerted effort to undermine the
attorney-client privilege, 26 it may, nevertheless, be an unintended
consequence.
Accordingly, as with the covered opinion rules in which the arcane
provisions begat disclaimers rather than advice, the amendments to
§ 6694, which could result in the imposition of substantial penalties and
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege, will mean that fewer
taxpayers are given useful tax advice. As
discussed above, this result is
61
antithetical to sound tax administration.
IV. TOWARD A MORE BENEFICIAL STANDARD FOR TAX ADVICE
While it is tempting to remain on the sidelines and merely jeer at
those in the game, in this part, I will set forth what I believe to be a
better, more straightforward, standard for tax advice. I start with the
premise that whatever rules or standards are adopted, the rules or
standards should both make tax shelters and other abusive transactions
more difficult and facilitate legitimate tax advice and legitimate tax

257. Disclosure has been one of the mainstays of Congress's efforts to combat tax
shelters. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6011(a), 6707A(a) (2000). It is therefore likely that Congress
will continue to require real disclosure.
258. E.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1999); United States
v. KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002).
259. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 22922320 (1961).
260. But see United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154-55 (D.R.I. 2007)
(refusing to enforce IRS summons for tax accrual work papers).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
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planning.262 While tax shelters need to be dealt with, and I have no
quarrel with going after shelter promoters, investors, and the
professionals who advise them, the vast majority of taxpayers are simply
trying to navigate their way through the system and the vast majority of
tax professionals are just trying to find the right answer. The tax advice
rules should not be geared only toward stopping the bad actors, thereby
making legitimate tax advice more difficult.
Rather, given the
complexity of tax law and the ubiquitous nature of taxes, an effective tax
system requires that knowledgeable tax professionals properly advise
their clients. The recent actions by Congress and the Treasury get in the
way of professionals providing this advice. Thus, the new provisions
threaten to create an environment where taxpayers are less well-advised
and the only taxpayers and professionals who do any type of planning or
receive any kind of advice are those with the highest risk tolerance. This
is not good for anyone. 63
So where should we go from here? We cannot return to the status
quo ante of realistic possibility of success or the wild-west days of the
pre-reasonable basis era. History has shown that those standards are
unworkable and many of the criticisms leveled against the recent
amendments can be aimed even more pointedly at the prior standards.
It would also be naive to think that policy makers would lower standards
in the face of the tax shelter problem. 2 64
An antecedent inquiry is whether the new canon should be a rule or
a standard. As Brian Galle has noted, the tax academy has arrived
rather late to the rules-versus-standards debate and interpretive
theory,2 65 but much has been written outside the tax literature on the
efficacy of adopting a rule or set of rules to deal with specific issues as

262. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 222.
263. As Lester Thurow stated:
No modern tax system or society can work without honest voluntary
compliance and cooperation from nearly all of its citizens. .

.

. The

Internal Revenue Service can collect taxes from the dishonest few, but it
cannot collect taxes from a dishonest majority or even a large minority.
When everyone begins to feel that he is a "sucker" if he pays taxes, it is
only a matter of time until the tax system collapses. America is close to
this point.
Lester C. Thurow, The Dishonest Economy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 21,1985, at 35.

264. As Austin Powers so eloquently stated, "That train has sailed." AUSTIN POWERS:
THE SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1999).

265. Galle, supra note 1, at 358.
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opposed to a standard of more general application. 266 Resolving this
rich debate is far beyond the scope of this Article. Without diminishing
the distinctions, I do not believe that in our context it is an either-or
question. Rules certainly have had a salutary impact on shelters in the
past. The enactment of the passive activity loss and at-risk rules
essentially shut down the shelter industry that thrived in the 1970s and
early 1980s. 267 However, as Professors Marvin A. Chirelstein and
Lawrence A. Zelenak point out, narrowly tailored legislative responses
to particular types of shelters are not an adequate solution to the shelter
problem overall.268 While many rules do indeed close loopholes, they
also create a fixed target at which tax lawyers may then aim. Perhaps
the best example of this is the use of the anti-Logan installment sales
regulations by the taxpayer in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner.
Moreover, any rules adopted would be prospective in application and,
like the adage applied to generals, Congress is always fighting the last
tax shelter war. It simply cannot keep up. 2 ° Thus, while rules do have
their place, standards must be used to fill the gap.
More importantly, rules designed to thwart tax shelters are only
designed to do just that-stop shelters. They offer little in the way of
defining legitimate tax advice. Indeed, as discussed at length above, a
key problem with the recent anti-shelter initiatives is that they make
legitimate tax planning more difficult. Thus, the standard or rule must
promote legitimate tax advice while deterring abusive transactions.
Standards, because of their more general application, are better at this.

266. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65, 65-66 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1706 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379,
398 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 62 (1992).
267. See 26 U.S.C. § 465 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
268. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak's
proposal to combat tax shelters is to have Congress enact a Code provision disallowing all
noneconomic losses. Id. at 1952. Other scholars have offered other solutions to the tax
shelter problem in recent years. See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 59-60;
Schler, supra note 1, at 367-83; Alexandra M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong:
Corporate Tax Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541,
1545-46 (2001). Each of these solutions has merit; however, a full discussion and dissection of
these proposals is beyond the scope of this Article.
269. 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998). The taxpayer in ACM Partnership used
regulations designed to prevent accelerated recovery of basis in an installment sale, known as
the anti-Logan installment sales regulations, to devise an elegant, and nearly successful, tax
avoidance scheme. See generally id.
270. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953.
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A. The Statute is the Thing
In formulating an appropriate standard for return advice, one must
first take into account the nature of the tax return, i.e., what it is that a
return is supposed to do. While there are other views of what a tax
return is designed to accomplish, our tax system has been based
primarily on what Professor Bittker refers to as the "honest-belief
approach.,27 Returns are signed under penalty of perjury that they are
true, correct, and complete to the best of the taxpayer's knowledge.
Thus, tax returns are viewed as expressing taxpayers' opinions of their
liability under the tax laws, and taxpayers discharge this obligation to
the government by expressing this opinion honestly.7 2 The negligence
penalty and the relief from that penalty has, since 1918, been based on
the idea that taxpayers may have an honest disagreement with the
government as to the meaning of certain Code provisions, and that
taxpayers should not be punished for such an honest disagreement. 73
Finally, and perhaps most important to our inquiry into tax advisor
standards, the reliance defense to the accuracy-related and fraud
penalties is premised on the idea that taxpayers may reasonably rely on
the advice of experts in attempting to discharge their obligations under
the law.274

If tax returns are indeed the honest attempts of taxpayers to report
their income and expenses, tax advisors may only satisfy their role in the
system by helping their clients meet that obligation.27 ' The reliance-oncounsel defense is based on the premise that tax law is unknowable to
most mortals and that taxpayers may utilize experts with more
knowledge of the law to help them satisfy their obligations under the
law. It is not a license to be more aggressive, nor is the defense designed
271. Bittker, supra note 255, at 254.

272. Rowen, supra note 82, at 250.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 60-72.
274. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2007).

275. See Falk, supra note 18, at 660.
Whether he is a tax cheater or Justice Holmes, the taxpayer seeks the

attorney's advice about what tax law requires. When tax law is uncertain,
the attorney's advice will concern legal risks and depend on the client's

attitude. Some clients are aggressive, others conservative, and others leave
it to the attorney to decide what risks to take. But uncertainty in the law-

a condition hardly unique to tax law-does not alter the attorney's basic
advising function. The attorney advisor tells the client what it takes to
comply with the law.
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to provide lucrative incomes to lawyers and accountants. Thus, the role
of advisors is to assist their clients in honestly reporting income and
deductions. 276 Advisors will disagree about the meaning of words and
phrases. However, in dealing with ambiguous provisions in the Code,
taxpayers and their advisors must attempt to discern what Congress
meant in enacting a given provision. 277 This in turn requires the advisor
to focus on the language of the statute at issue. The practice of law,
including tax law, is fundamentally the practice of statutory
interpretation, and the tax advice standard should require advisors to
focus on the language of the Code.278
The risk of basing the tax advice standard on the text itself is, of
course, that such a formulation will only play into the hands of the
hyper-textualists who have been the cause of the current plague of
shelters and other abusive transactions.27 9 After all, the courts have
dealt with many of these shelters using a broad economic substance or
276. Returning again to first principles, Canon 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which were adopted by the ABA in 1908, provides:
[The lawyer] must also observe and advise his client to observe the
statut[ory] law, though until a statute shall have been construed and
interpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as
to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just
meaning and extent.
ABA Comm. on Code of Prof'l Ethics, Final Rep. (1908). Thus, Canon 32 does not dictate
that lawyers make whatever arguments they deem reasonable or arguable, but rather to
advise as to what they conscientiously believe the statute's meaning to be. Rowen, supra note
82, at 246.
277. Falk, supra note 18, at 658 ("In the debate over Proposed Opinion 314 Revision,
both sides 'did not question the desirability of congruence between the minimum ethical and
penalty standards.' Yet, it can only confuse matters to treat the attorney's ethical obligation
as requiring something other than advice on compliance with the law." (footnotes omitted)).
278. Galle, supra note 1, at 358.
279. See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4.
Under the textualist approach, it is much easier for an attorney to write a
favorable opinion for transactions that are designed to comply with the
letter of the law, but not its spirit, for at least two reasons. First, the
attorney is permitted to ignore, or at least downplay, any legislative
history that would argue against, or undercut, the desired tax results.
Second, under a textualist approach, it is arguable that various wellaccepted judicial doctrines, such as the business purpose doctrine, are
suspect. At the extreme, a textualist might argue that these doctrines are
the product of judicial activism and either should no longer be followed,
or at a minimum should not be extended into new areas of the law.
Id. Cunningham and Repetti blame the ascendancy of textualism for the recent tax shelter
crisis. Id.
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business purpose doctrine. These tests are needed, so the argument
goes, to override the tendency of lawyers and accountants to view the
Code in isolation. In the next section, I will show that the economic
substance and business purpose doctrines have drifted far from their
original moorings and that the true focus of those doctrines is consistent
with my proposed standard that focuses on the language and purpose of
the statute at issue. Moreover, the economic substance and business
purpose tests have only clouded the inquiry and often offer little to the
analysis of whether a transaction is proper.280 I will analyze the
economic substance test in the context of the British House of Lords'
recent opinion in MacNiven v. Westmoreland Investments Ltd.,18' which
rejected a broad-based economic substance doctrine in favor of a
standard that examines the meaning of the statute and intent of the
legislator.
B. MacNiven v. Westmoreland
As economic substance cases go, the transaction in MacNiven was
quite straightforward.2 82 The issue in MacNiven was whether an interest
deduction should be allowed on amounts paid from a subsidiary to its
parent."8 The taxpayer, Westmoreland Investments Ltd., owed the
trustees of its parent, the Electricity Supply Pension Scheme, over £70
284
million, including more than £40 million in accrued interest.
Westmoreland's liabilities greatly exceeded its assets, and all the
liabilities were owed to the trustees. 285 Given this rather bleak balance
sheet, Westmoreland was valueless with no great expectations of a
turnaround, and it would have a dickens of a time finding a buyer.286
But Westmoreland did have one potential asset, which ironically was
also its biggest liability-its substantial accrued interest liability.2
Under section 338 of the United Kingdom's Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1988, "payments of interest, other than interest on bank

280. Cf.Percy H. Winfield, Ethics in English Case Law, 45 HARV. L. REV. 112, 115

(1931) (quoting Lord Justice Bowen's statement that the state of "a man's mind is as much an
ascertainable fact as the state of his digestion").
281.
282.
283.
284.

[2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, T 29 (UKHC).
Compare ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F. 3d 231, 239-42 (3d Cir. 1998).
MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, 19.
Id. 9. The word "scheme" does not appear to be used in the pejorative American

sense.
285. Id.

286. Id. 1 10.
287. Id.
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loans, may be set against profits, and any unused excess may be carried
forward under section 75 of the Taxes Act 1988."28
Thus, if
Westmoreland could pay the pension scheme trustees the £40 million of
interest it owed, it would have value as a company with substantial
established tax losses. 9 A purchaser could then transfer incomeproducing assets to Westmoreland and take advantage of the losses to
offset any future profits.29
But first Westmoreland had to pay the interest it owed to the
trustees of the pension scheme. 9 Westmoreland was obviously unable
to make any payments out of its own resources, and no bank or other
third party was likely to loan it the £40 million necessary. 292 As a result,
the trustees of the pension scheme itself lent the money to
Westmoreland, which then used the funds to pay off its interest liability,
claiming an interest deduction for the amount paid.2 93 Significant to the
House of Lords' opinion, the initial trier of fact found "that the steps
involved in these transactions were genuine," and there was no
allegation that any of the steps were shams.9
The case ultimately came before the House of Lords on the issue of
whether the interest deduction claimed by Westmoreland should be
allowed. 295 The government's position was that the amounts paid by
Westmoreland did not constitute "payments" within the meaning of
section 338 because the payments had no commercial purpose, were
purely for the purpose of avoiding tax, and therefore fell within the
Ramsay principle.2 6 The Ramsay principle, from W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v.
297 is the House
Inland Revenue Commissioners,
of Lords' iteration of the
economic substance and business purpose doctrines. 298 The position of
Westmoreland was that the payments made to the trustees of the
pension scheme were legitimate transactions that met the definition of

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. [ 12.
Id. [ 19.

296. Id. T 27.
297. [1982] A.C. 300 (H.L.).
298. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, 11 30-32. Notably, the Ramsay principle traces its lineage
to the opinion of Judge Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). See infra
text accompanying notes 313-17.
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"payment" within the meaning of the statute.299 The House of Lords
was therefore required to determine whether transactions that meet the
terms of the statute, but which may have no apparent commercial
purpose, should be respected for tax purposes. 300
Giving the main speech for the House was Lord Hoffmann, who
began by rejecting the Crown's broad application of the Ramsay
principle. 031 Finding that the Ramsay principal was being applied as "an
overriding legal principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue law
without regard to the language or purpose of any particular provision,"
Lord Hoffmann held that there is "ultimately only one principle of
construction, namely to ascertain what Parliament meant by using the

language of the statute."

302

Lord Hoffmann began his support of this form of textualism, which
he has referred to as the "purposive approach," with the idea that words
and phrases used in the law, particularly freestanding codes like the

299. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, J[ 19.
300. Id.
301. Id. 9128-29.
302. Id. 9129. It is fair to say that the U.S. courts' usage and treatment of the economic
substance, business purpose, and sham transaction doctrines have not been consistent. A
complete treatment of these doctrines in the U.S. courts is well beyond the scope of this
Article. For an excellent summary of these cases, see Leland Gardner, An Elephant in the
Room: Double Deductions and the Economic Substance Doctrine in Coltec Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 60 TAX LAW. 519 (2007). As Gardner explains, the courts of appeals use
essentially three approaches in analyzing transactions. "Some circuits apply a conjunctive test:
a transaction must satisfy both the business purpose and the economic substance inquiries."
Id. at 525-26. See, e.g., Illes v. Comm'r, 982 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992); Shriver v. Comm'r,
899 F.2d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1990); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91
(4th Cir. 1985). Other circuits use a disjunctive test and consider each of the tests
independently and may disregard a transaction if it lacks either a business purpose or
economic substance. See, e.g., Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm'r, 320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2002);
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001); ASA Investerings
P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000). And other circuits apply a unitary test
considering business purpose and economic substance as factors to inform a sham transaction
analysis. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 246 n.29 (3d Cir. 1998); Casebeer v.
Comm'r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); James v. Comm'r, 899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th
Cir. 1990). In addition to three different approaches, courts have also applied the tests in
numerous, mind-numbing ways. Some courts apply a pro-taxpayer presumption, where the
transaction will be allowable if it possesses either a business purpose or economic substance.
See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440 (4th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994). Other courts apply the opposite
presumption: the transaction will be disallowable if it lacks either a business purpose or
economic substance. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 440; Wexler, 31 F.3d at 127.
Moreover, some courts have conflated the economic substance doctrine with the sham
transaction doctrine. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 440; Wexler, 31 F.3d at 127.
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income tax, have their own independent meaning." For example, when
an economist says that "real" income has fallen, the economist is not
intending to contrast real incomes with imaginary ones.14 Rather, the
comparison is between incomes that have been adjusted for inflation
and those that have not. Thus, in order to know what an economist
means by "real," one must first identify what Lord Hoffmann referred
to as the "relevant concept" (in this example, inflation adjustment) by
reference to which speaker is using the word.0 5

Lord Hoffmann then pointed out that tax statutes often use terms
and refer to purely legal concepts that have no meaning (or at least a
different meaning) outside the tax laws. 3 6 For example, the term
"basis" is a term of common understanding in tax law, but its tax
definition only has meaning in the unique world of tax law. 7 In viewing
these statutes, one must examine them within the relevant concept of
the particular Code provision and statutory schema.0 8
Lord Hoffmann then addressed whether general principles like the
Ramsay principle could be used to decide whether the taxpayer's actions

constituted acceptable tax mitigation or unacceptable tax avoidance. 09
Lord Hoffmann held that when the statutory provisions at issue do not
contain words like "avoidance" or "mitigation," it does not help to
introduce them. 30 Thus, whether steps that are taken for the avoidance

of tax are acceptable or unacceptable is the conclusion at which one
arrives by applying the statutory language to the facts of the case, rather

303. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311,
40-46.
304. Id. 1 40.
305. Id. 58. This approach is consistent with modern textualist interpretation, which
holds that language only has meaning in context. Modern textualists therefore often resort to
extrastatutory contextual clues. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 14, at 75-76.
306. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, 58.
307. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1016 (West 2007). Lord Hoffmann used the example of whether a
stamp duty is payable upon a "conveyance or transfer on sale" pursuant to Schedule 13,
paragraph 1(1) to the Finance Act 1999. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311,
58. "[T]he statutory
language defines the document subject to duty essentially by reference to external legal
concepts such as 'conveyance' and 'sale."' Id.
308. As Professor Manning points out, modern textualism is thus consistent with
Wittgenstein's insights about language. Manning, supra note 14, at 79 n.29 (quoting Cont'l
Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) ("You don't have to be
Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication
depends on meanings shared by interpretive communities."); LUDWIG WrlrGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 134-42 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958)
(emphasizing "the use of words in linguistic interactions within the relevant community")).
309. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, 1 58.
310. Id. T 62.
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than a test for deciding whether the statute applies or not.31 ' Lord
Hoffmann argued that it does not promote "clarity of thought" to use
terms like "stratagem or device."3 2' Transactions either work or they do
not.
If they do not work, the reason ... is simply that upon
the true construction of the statute, the transaction which
was designed to avoid the charge to tax actually comes
within it. It is not that the statute has a penumbral spirit
which strikes down devices or stratagems designed to
avoid its terms or exploit its loopholes."
31 4
The House of Lords therefore allowed the deduction.
MacNiven thus stands for the proposition that in evaluating the
reach of a statute, one must employ a "purposive approach" to
determine the nature of the transaction to which it was intended to
apply and then to decide whether the actual transaction (which might
involve considering the overall effect of a number of elements intended
to operate together) answers to the statutory description. This means
that the question is always whether the relevant provision of the statute,
upon its true construction, applies to the facts of a particular case."'
In an article published in the British Tax Review,3 6 Lord Hoffmann
explains that the "purposive construction" he applied to tax statutes in
MacNiven had as its origin Judge Hand's opinion in Helvering v.

311. Id.; see also PAUL, supra note 5, at 91-92.
In the field of tax avoidance there is special need to be distrustful of glib
rules of thumb and formulae masquerading as authoritative general
principles-special need because the general propositions commonly
employed in the subject are so broad and have such an elastic vocabulary.
Words like "reality," "fiction," "essence," "form," and "substance" have
little displacement, and usually mean little more than what is desired for
the occasion. They are amorphous, question-begging words without fixed
content, and their chief function is to make an unsure conclusion sound
well.
PAUL, supra note 5, at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
312. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, $ 62.
313. Id. 62 (quoting Norglen Ltd. v. Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd. [1999] 2 A.C. 1, 1314 (H.L.)) (citations omitted).
314. Id. T 74.
315. Id. 8 (Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.J.).
316. Leonard Hoffmann, Tax Avoidance, 2 B.T.R. 197 (2005).
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Gregory.37 The irony of using the source of the economic substance and
business purpose doctrines to overturn a broad economic substance
doctrine was not lost on Lord Hoffmann, who used the genesis of those
doctrines as part of his call to return the focus to the statute. Quoting at
length from Judge Hand's opinion in Gregory, in which Judge Hand
finds that Ms. Gregory's plan for a corporate reorganization3 8 was not
entitled to tax free treatment because her artificial scheme was "not
what the statute means by a 'reorganization,"' Lord Hoffmann argues
that Judge Hand's decision is based on statutory construction and not
some overriding business purpose doctrine. 3 9 According to Lord
Hoffmann, the reorganization in Gregory was not given tax-free
317. See id. at 197-99. Lord Hoffmann has also applied this purposive construction to
patent disputes. See, e.g., Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL
46, [2005] 1 All E.R. 667 (UKHL) (Hoffmann, L.J.).
"Purposive construction" does not mean that one is extending or going
beyond the definition of the technical matter for which the patentee seeks
protection in the claims. The question is always what the person skilled in
the art would have understood the patentee to be using the language of
the claim to mean. And for this purpose, the language he has chosen is
usually of critical importance.
Id.

34.
318. In Gregory, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a corporation holding
appreciated shares of a subsidiary corporation. In an attempt to distribute these appreciated
shares to herself without the transaction being taxed as a dividend, the taxpayer organized a
new corporation, transferred the shares to the new corporation, and immediately dissolved
the new corporation. As the sole shareholder of the new corporation, Gregory received the
shares. Gregory then sold the shares and paid tax on the proceeds at the capital gain rate.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
319. Hoffmann, supra note 316, at 197-98. Lord Hoffmann quoted the following
language from Judge Hand's opinion:
If what was done here was what was intended by [the statute], it is of
no consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income
tax, as it certainly was. . . . [But] the purpose of the section is plain
enough; men engaged in enterprises . . . might wish to consolidate, or
divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings. Such transactions were
not to be considered as realizing any profit, because the collective
interests still remained in solution. But the underlying presupposition is
plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to
the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident,
egregious to its prosecution . . . . We cannot treat as inoperative the
transfer of shares . . . . The transfer passed title . . . and the taxpayer
became a shareholder in the transferee. All these steps were real and their
only defect was that they were not what the statute means by a
'reorganisation' [sic].
Id. at 197-98 (quoting Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11).
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treatment because the concept of a "plan of reorgani[z]ation" in the
statute contemplates doing something for a business purpose and not
solely to avoid tax.3 2' Thus, the requirement of a business purpose was
dictated by the statute itself, and Judge Hand did not apply any rule
taken from outside the statute.
Gregory cannot, according to Lord Hoffmann, be read to hold that
whatever the provisions of a statute might be, a transaction that has no
business purpose will not be respected for tax purposes.3 2' As discussed
above, there are too many instances in the Code in which transactions
entered into solely for tax purposes are respected for there to be any
real viability to such a broad application of the rule.322 Lord Hoffmann
asserts that tax avoidance should be a contradiction in terms, if by tax
avoidance we mean transactions successfully structured to avoid a tax
that the legislature intended to impose.3 23 The only way in which a
legislature can express
an intention to impose a tax is by a statute that
31 4
tax.
a
such
imposes
Lord Hoffmann asserts that he is applying a "purposive
construction" to a text.3 5
However, while styling himself as a
purposivist, Lord Hoffmann is, in reality, a modern textualist. In his
326
recent article, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?,
Professor
John Manning discusses the common ground, as well as the differences
between purposivists and textualists. Professor Manning argues that
purposivists from the legal process tradition believe that it is unrealistic
to believe "that Congress collectively knows or cares about the semantic
detail of often complex statutes. ' ' 127 For purposivists, enforcing the
purpose or policy of a statute, rather than the minutiae of its semantic
detail, better serves the legislative supremacy that they argue textualists
are trying to defend.328 Professor Manning argues that in contrast,
textualists believe that the purposivist approach ignores the legislative
compromise that created the particular text at issue.3 29 Textualists assert
that legislative supremacy is best served by "attributing to legislators the
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
See supra note 11.
Hoffman, supra note 316, at 206.
See id.

325. Id.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Manning, supra note 14, at 70.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 92.
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understanding that a reasonable person conversant with applicable
conventions would attach to the enacted text in context."33 Textualists
point out that purposivism cannot deal adequately with legislative
compromise because semantic detail, in the end, is the only way
legislators can actually set forth the agreed-upon legislative
compromise.331 Despite the significant differences, recent scholarship
has recognized the common ground among modern textualism and
modern purposivism.33 2 Modern textualists are cognizant of context as
well as text, while modern purposivists give great weight to statutory
text.333

Given the common ground, what differentiates modern purposivists
and textualists is that purposivists will give deference to the policy
concerns underlying the legislative choice, even when those policies are
contrary to the language of the text.33 4 It is in this vein that Lord
Hoffmann and his opinion in MacNiven part company with the
purposivists. The problem with using policies like business purpose or
economic substance is that these are not consistent policies throughout
the Code. 33 As indicated, there are numerous instances in which
transactions entered into solely for tax purposes are perfectly acceptable
and no business purpose is required for those positions to be upheld.336

To paraphrase Lord Hoffmann, one cannot superimpose the economic
substance and business purposes as overriding legal principles upon the
whole Internal Revenue Code without regard to the language or
purpose of any particular provision.337

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 75 (citing Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're
Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretationis an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967,
974-78 (2004) (arguing that textualism is, at root, a form of intentionalism); Caleb Nelson,
What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353 (2005)).
333. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 35
(2006).
334. Manning, supra note 14, at 96.
335. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 5, at 90 (Economic substance and business purpose
doctrines are too often maxims that "have little displacement, and usually mean little more
than what is desired for the occasion.").
336. Indeed, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak in their proposal that would disallow
noneconomic losses would permit some noneconomic losses to be deductible, noting that
"Congress would not want to disallow every type of noneconomic loss, and that some
mechanism is needed to separate the deductible wheat from the nondeductible chaff."
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1955.
337. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311,
29
(UKHC).
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Thus, Lord Hoffmann's purposive construction is in reality
textualism in which one looks at the purpose or policy behind the
particular statute at issue, rather than some overarching policy
permeating the entire Code. Given the capricious use of the economic
substance doctrines, MacNiven is a clearer treatment of shelters and
provides a more principled basis for evaluating whether a transaction is
legitimate tax planning or an abusive tax shelter. The purposivist
construction of MacNiven provides a real service to tax analysis:
textualists may not rely solely on the text, applying it out of context or
contrary to the purpose for which a particular tax statute was enacted.
Nor may the purposivists indiscriminately fire policies like business
purpose or economic substance to overturn the otherwise plain meaning
of texts. The MacNiven doctrine recognizes that tax definitions are
unique to the Code and that there is no economic substance apart from
the legal definition the Code places on these definitions. When we say
something lacks a business purpose or lacks economic substance, what
we are saying is that the purpose or substance behind the action is not
that which was contemplated by the statute. Therefore, we should focus
on the purpose for which the statute was enacted, focusing primarily on
the language Congress used.

338

338. Focusing on both the text of the statute and the purposes for which that provision

was enacted is important not only for properly interpreting the tax laws but also for
promoting compliance with and respect for the law.

Freedman, supra note 43, at 346.

Taxpayers often enter into transactions structured in a way to maximize tax benefits because
they have been advised by accountants to structure them in that manner. Some taxpayers do

not truly need structures like S corporations for their business operations, but they have been
advised that this is the way to set up a business in a tax-efficient way. And if they find the
advice odd, they simply believe this is one of the mysterious things about the way the tax
system works. If taxpayers are then told that they cannot structure a transaction in a certain

way because it was done solely for tax purposes, they are left more than a little perplexed. As
Professor Freedman asks:

What message are such people being given by the tax system? Are they to
think of tax in terms of economic reality, fairness and rationality when it
at first appears that incorporation will legitimately save tax and they then
find that some of those benefits have been negated in a complex way that
will probably cost them considerable amounts in professional fees? The

law has real substance here because it has consequences in terms of rights
and obligations.... Right from the start he has been given a signal that it

is necessary to take account of taxation when making commercial
decisions and that the rules can change. The culture of artificiality is
established and so it continues. . . In the light of this, it is not surprising
that business owners will soon come to believe that it is perfectly natural
to do artificial things for tax purposes and that this impression permeates

right up the scale to large companies whose directors, used to tax
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Many have decried the rise of textualism in tax advice and lay the
blame for the increase in shelter activity at the feet of the textualists.33 9 I
fully recognize that rejecting a broad application of the economic
substance and business purpose doctrines will likely be ill-received.
However, in my view, the problem with the strain of textualism that has
given rise to tax shelters is not that these lawyers focused too much on
the text. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that they applied the text
out of context and inconsistent with the true purpose of the statute. The
gamesmanship engendered by the realistic possibility of success and the
more likely than not standards only adds to these problems.
In addition, as Professor David A. Weisbach has noted, the use of
purposivist doctrines like economic substance and business purpose
have made shelters more exotic and complicated. 3" The basis of these
doctrines is that transactions undertaken solely for tax purposes are
disallowed. The doctrines thus create the incentive to put just enough
window dressing-some business activity, some element of risk-to pass
the business purpose or economic substance test.14 ' By encouraging the
addition of layers of entities and transactions, these doctrines have had
the perverse effect of making modern shelters more complicated and
therefore more difficult to detect. The solution is to return advisors to
the text, not to further divorce them from it. Fidelity to the statute
simply is not the cause of shelters.
Moreover, in many instances, the creation and promotion of tax
shelters was the result of out-and-out fraud and was not the result of a
misreading or misapplication of complex doctrines. Just as Professors
Chirelstein and Zelenak's proposal would distinguish between
traditional tax planning and planning that generates abusive tax
shelters,42 policy makers must distinguish between aggressive tax
planning and criminal tax fraud. We must recognize that neither a silver
bullet nor a broad-spectrum antibiotic3 43 will stop truly fraudulent and

impacting on all their decisions, consider it fair game to take tax into
consideration in all planning and then to go on to undertake tax driven
activities.
Id. at 344-45. One of the reasons for attacking tax shelters is that it breeds cynicism toward
the tax system. But the ad hoc use of maxims like business purpose does the same thing.
339. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4; Galle, supra note 1, at 359-60;
Weisbach, supra note 6, at 222.
340. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 237.
341. Id. at 237-38.
342. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953-54.
343. Id. at 1951.
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abusive shelters. We should leave the eradication of these types of
shelters to law enforcement and develop a standard that will encourage
legitimate tax advice and discourage tax advice that amounts to little
more than game-playing.
C. Using the MacNiven Analysis as a Return Advice Standard
While the standard set forth in MacNiven is designed to be used by
courts in statutory construction, its principles can also provide guidance
to lawyers in advising clients. Like courts in the analysis of completed
transactions, tax advisors should apply a "purposive textualist"
approach to the Code. This requires lawyers to give a purposive
construction to the statute to determine the nature of the transaction to
which it was intended to apply and then to decide whether the actual
transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a
number of elements intended to operate together) is consistent with the
statutory description. This means that the question is always whether
the language and purpose of the statute apply to the facts of the
transaction.3"4
In employing a purposive construction to the Code, a tax lawyer
must look at the purpose for which the statute was enacted and attempt
to apply the statute consistently with its true nature and purpose. The
primary focus should always be the text of the statute. In most
circumstances, the lawyer will examine only the single Code provision at
issue, while at other times, the entire Code, and not just one provision in
isolation, must be examined. If relevant, the lawyer should also consult
court opinions and legislative history.345
Accordingly, a correct and fair reading of the text itself, or "the right
answer" if you will, should be the foundation of the standard. While this
purposive textualism standard can be formulated in a number of ways,
my standard is as follows:
A tax professional may advise a client to take a position
if, based on a good-faith and sound construction of the
applicable statutory provision, the position is consistent
with the statute and congressional intent.

344. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311,
8
(UKHC) (Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.J.).
345. Paul, supra note 34, at 417 ("The tax adviser must accept interstitial judicial

legislation as one of the realities of life. Legislative words are not inert, but derive vitality
from the obvious purpose at which they are aimed.").
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The phrase "sound construction of the applicable statutory
provision" is taken from the ABA Tax Section's Proposed Revision to
Formal Opinion 314,346 while the phrase "consistent with the statute and
congressional intent" is taken from the principal purpose definition of
the covered opinion rules.347 This straightforward formulation, based
not on chances of success but on the text itself, will hopefully return tax
advice to its original premise for which the reliance defense was
enacted.348 The standard would require an advisor to employ a sound
construction of the statute, which, if employed in good faith, would
reduce tax shelter advice. If the advisor, in good faith, believes a
position is consistent with the statute and congressional intent, that
should be sufficient for the advice to be given. If taxpayers reasonably
rely on the advice of competent advisors, then they can sign their
returns under penalty of perjury believing them to be true, correct, and
complete. If there is substantial authority for the position, taxpayers
need not disclose their position under § 6662(d).3 49 Likewise, if
substantial authority does not exist, but an advisor nevertheless believes
the position meets the standard, an advisor may advise the taxpayer to
350
take the position without disclosing it.
Will this standard put an end to tax shelters? Clearly not. The
desire by lawyers and accountants to make money and please clients will
always create pressures to take aggressive positions on tax returns.5
However, as I hope I have shown, those pressures are exacerbated by a
system (now, more than forty years old) that encourages taxpayers and
346. The proposed revisions in turn borrowed this language from Proposed Treasury
Regulation § 1.6661-3(b)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 10,862 (Mar. 15, 1983). Falk, supra note 18, at 65657. Unfortunately, for tax administration, the proposed revisions were not adopted by the
ABA Rules Committee, which elected to espouse the realistic possibility of success standard.
Id.
347. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2007). The standard is also consistent with the portion
proposed regulations under § 6694 where a more likely than not conclusion cannot be
reached because of insufficient authorities: The proposed regulations provide that a "tax
return preparer may reasonably believe that a position more likely than not would be
sustained on its merits despite the absence of other types of authority if the position is
supported by a well-reasoned construction of the applicablestatutory provision." Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008) (emphasis added).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 60-75.
349. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
350. This was the position of the committee that sought the revisions to ABA Formal
Opinion 314. Matthew C. Ames, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and the Tax
Audit Lottery, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411,421 (1987).
351. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 121, at 1577-78.
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their advisors to push the envelope of statutory interpretation. My
modest proposal amounts to this: If we change the question from "what
can I get away with?" to "what is the right answer?" we might get a
better answer.
A good-faith belief would require a tax advisor to examine the entire
Code, legislative history, the Treasury's position in regulations and
other written guidance, as well as court cases. Nevertheless, an advisor
still could give good-faith advice on a position in the face of court cases
and Treasury regulations to the contrary, if the advisor believes the
position represents a sound construction of the statute and is consistent
with the purpose of the statute.
D. Applying the Standard
The proposed standard would be consistent with the way in which
many tax advisors operate currently, and it would be consistent with
much of the advice already being given. Many advisors are already
attempting to ascertain the "right answer," and many clients just want to
know what the tax law requires. The standard is more important in
cases where the client wishes to be more aggressive. There will, of
course, be cases in which reasonable minds will differ as to whether a
position represents a good-faith and sound construction of the
applicable statutory provision that is consistent with the statute and
congressional intent. In order to examine the outer limits of the
proposed standard, I will analyze the standard in the context of two
notable, perhaps notorious, 35
cases:
Gitlitz v. Commissioner... and ACM
4
Partnershipv. Commissioner.
1. Gitlitz v. Commissioner
In Gitlitz, the taxpayers were shareholders of an S corporation that
had a large amount of losses that could not be deducted because the
shareholders had insufficient basis in their stock (so-called "suspended
losses").355 The corporation received cancellation of indebtedness
352. Professional responsibility dictates would require the lawyer, however, to inform
his or her clients that they could be subject to penalties for taking a position contrary to
established precedent. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
353. 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
354. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
355. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(d) (2000); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210. Losses at the S corporation
level flow through to the shareholders of the corporation and reduce the shareholders' basis
in their stock. Losses in excess of basis are suspended until the shareholders increase their
basis, thereby freeing up the suspended losses.
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income ("COD income"), which, because the corporation was insolvent
at the time of the discharge, was not subject to tax.356 The issue was
whether the COD income was an "item of income" subject to passthrough under § 1366(a)(1)(A), which the shareholders could then use

to increase their basis in the corporation's stock, thereby freeing up the
suspended losses.

35 7

The Supreme Court held that the COD income was

an item of income and allowed the increase in basis.358 Many have
argued the Supreme Court's decision was incorrect.59

However, does

the taxpayer's position represent a good-faith and sound construction of
the applicable statutory provision, and is the position consistent with the
statute and congressional intent?
The position of whether COD income was an "item of income" for
purposes of § 1366 certainly had clear support in the statute and

regulations. Section 1366(a)(1) defined the term "items of income," to
include "tax-exempt" income,3" and Title 26 of the Code of Federal

Regulations § 1.1367-1(d)(2) provided: "[A basis] adjustment for a
nontaxable item is determined for the taxable year in which the item
would have been includible or deductible under the corporation's
method of accounting for Federal income tax purposes if the item had
been subject to Federal income taxation., 36' Hence, the Code and

regulations appeared to contemplate basis increases for tax-exempt or
nontaxable items, and the taxpayer's position thus was at least arguably
a sound reading of the Code provisions at issue.3 62 There was certainly

no obvious reading to the contrary 3 63 and the result was consistent with
356. 26 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2000); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210.
357. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212.
358. Id. at 218-19.
359. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., What Were They Thinking? BB&T Versus Gitlitz,
120 TAx NOTES 793, 864-65 (2008); Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 17-20.
360. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1) (2000). The government chose instead to litigate the issue in
the face of the plain meaning of the statute and regulations. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212. While it
is true that the Treasury adopted new regulations tightening the definition of "tax-exempt
income," those regulations were adopted during the course of the litigation of Gitlitz and the
other cases, and the regulations proposed read curiously like the government's briefs filed
with the courts in those cases.
361. Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-1(d)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
362. Full disclosure: I was a member of the law firm, Chicoine & Hallett, that
represented the taxpayers in Gitlitz from the Tax Court through the Supreme Court. I
therefore cannot claim to be completely objective about the decision issued by the Supreme
Court.
363. Indeed, the government took one position in the Tax Court, Nelson v. Comm'r, 110
T.C. 114, 115 (1998), another position in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 182 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 1999). and yet another position in
the Supreme Court, Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212 n.5. The Tax Court based its decision on one
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the congressional purpose of the statute to provide tax-free treatment to
discharges of indebtedness and to allow increases in basis for all items of

income, including tax-exempt income."
Even if one were to look
outside the language and purpose of the statutes, there was also no
general purpose in the Code preventing the result obtained-the lone
dissenter in the Supreme Court was left to resort to "Congress's likely
intent" that ambiguous statutes should be read as "closing, not
'
maintaining, tax loopholes."365
Thus, while one may disagree on a policy
basis with the decision of the Court in Gitlitz,36 the position was one
that had strong support in the statute and regulations.367

Moreover, I submit that this is the type of issue for which tax
advisors should be able to give positive advice. First, the transactions

were not entered into to obtain the tax benefit, but were the result of
real discharges of indebtedness between unrelated parties. 36 Thus, the

taxpayers did not order their affairs to obtain a certain result or create a
transaction out of whole cloth, but merely took advantage of the tax law
("exploited the loophole") to get the most favorable tax treatment for
their genuine transaction.
Second, Gitlitz is one of the rare
circumstances where the plain meaning of the statute created a result

that was probably not intended by Congress, but there was no language
extant in the Code, regulations, or legislative history from which that
intent could be divined. Indeed, Professor Eustice warned Congress and
the Treasury years before the Gitlitz litigation that the plain reading of
the Code and regulations required the result ultimately reached by the

interpretation of the Code, which the government did not defend on appeal, while the Tenth
Circuit's decision was grounded on different reasoning, which the government, again, did not
defend in the Supreme Court. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212 n.5; Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1148;
Nelson, 110 T.C. at 115. This game of legal whack-a-mole belies any contention that the law
"clearly" disallowed the claimed increase in basis.
364. It is safe to say that Congress did not contemplate this issue one way or another.
365. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 223 (Breyer, J. dissenting). Justice Breyer cited no authority for
whence this congressional intent was obtained. However, Justice Breyer did cite legislative
history that purported to support the IRS's position. Id. at 221 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-111,
at 624-25 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 855-56). However, the House Report
cited dealt with elections by taxpayers to exclude from gross income the discharge of qualified
real property business indebtedness. H.R. REP. No. 103-111 at 624-25. The House Report
did not purport to provide a general explanation regarding the workings of § 108 in the
context of S corporations.
366. See, e.g., Witzel v. Comm'r, 200 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2000) ("It is hard to
understand the rationale for using a tax exemption to avoid taxation not only on the income
covered by the exemption but also on unrelated income that is not tax exempt.").
367. For a contrary view, see Cummings, supra note 359, at 865.
368. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 209.
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Court.369 Congress ultimately changed the law,37 ° thereby showing its

intent (or at least the intent of that Congress). Accordingly, while I
generally disagree with the notion that encouraging aggressive tax
return positions creates a better Code, Gitlitz might well be one case in
which well-advised, risk-tolerant taxpayers did improve the Code.
Regardless, a tax advisor could, prior to the amendment of § 108, advise
a client in good faith that COD income is an item of income that
increases the basis in S corporation stock.
/

2. A CM Partnershipv. Commissioner

In ACM Partnership,the taxpayer, Colgate, entered into a series of
transactions to take advantage of the contingent installment sales
"'
A contingent installment sale is "a sale or other
regulations.37
disposition of property in which the aggregate selling price cannot be
determined by the close of the taxable year in which such sale or other
disposition occurs. ' 37 2 Where the total sales price is contingent on some

future event, but the sales agreement provides a specific period over
which payments may be received, the temporary regulations generally
require the taxpayer to allocate a portion of its basis pro rata over each
of the taxable years in which payments are to be received. 73 The
taxpayer's income for each year from a contingent installment sale is
therefore the excess of the payments received in that year over the pro
rata portion of the basis allocated to that year.74
The transaction entered into by Colgate was very convoluted and
had numerous steps and players.375 Reduced to its simplest terms,
Colgate entered into a partnership with Merrill Lynch and an offshore
bank not subject to U.S. tax.3 76 The bank held an eighty percent interest
in the partnership, Colgate held a nineteen percent interest, and Merrill

369. James S. Eustice, FinanciallyDistressedS Corporations,53 TAx NOTES 97 (1991).

370. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 402, 116
Stat. 21 (2002).
371. 157 F.3d 231, 235-36 (3rd Cir. 1998).
372. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c) (2007).
373. Id. § 15a.453-1(c)(3).
374. See id.

375. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 233-38. For an excellent explanation of the
transaction, see Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1943-45. Similar transactions were
entered into by the taxpayers in Saba Partnershipv. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir.
2001); ASA Investments Partnershipv. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505, 508-11 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

and others.
376. See ACM P'ship,157 F.3d at 235.
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Lynch held a one percent interest.377 Each of the parties contributed
cash, totaling $175 million, and in year one, the partnership bought and
sold various securities. 78 Ultimately, but still in year one, the
partnership sold $175 million in Citicorp notes and received in return
cash (equal to the cash contributed by the offshore bank) and new
notes, which were to be paid quarterly over a five-year period, and
which had an interest rate that varied each quarter depending upon the
London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) interest rate. 79 Since the
amount of the payments were to vary each year, the transaction was
subject (or so the taxpayer hoped) to the contingent installment sales
rules.3s° As a result, the $175 million basis was required to be recovered
ratably over the next five years.3 8 '

In year one, under the contingent installment sales rules, the
partnership used twenty percent of the basis to offset the payments
received, which generated a large gain, eighty percent of which was
allocated to the offshore bank." The bank, of course, did not mind the
large amount of gain attributed to it because it was not subject to tax in
the United States.383 The bank's interest in the partnership was then
liquidated, and it received back all of the cash it had contributed.3 8 This
left Colgate with a ninety-nine percent interest in the partnership and
Merrill Lynch with a one percent interest.8
In year two, the partnership sold the LIBOR notes."" Under the
contingent installment sales rules, since the contingent sales contract
was now to be closed, the partnership could offset its entire remaining
basis against the amount realized on the sale.387 Not surprisingly, this
resulted in a large loss to the partnership, and ninety-nine percent of the
loss was allocated to Colgate.3" When the dust settled from these
transactions, the offshore bank had a $90 million gain, which again was

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. at 240.
Id.
ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 42 (1997).
ACM P'ship,157 F.3d at 240.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252 n.40.
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not subject to U.S. tax, and Colgate had a $90 million loss, which of
course could be used to offset its U.S. tax liability.389
While extraordinarily clever, does this transaction reflect a goodfaith and sound construction of the applicable statutory provision, and is
the position consistent with the statute and congressional intent? In my
view it is not, and thus, under the proposed standard a tax advisor could
not give a positive opinion on this transaction. An entire article could
be devoted to dissecting this transaction, and I cannot do it justice here.
While the transaction could be attacked on other grounds, at bottom,
this transaction fails for the same reason Judge Hand disallowed tax-free
treatment to Ms. Gregory's proposed reorganization: the installment
sale of the notes was not within the purpose of the statutory definition
of a "sale." 39 The term "sale" contemplates a bona fide disposition of
property between unrelated parties.
A pre-arranged series of
transactions designed to create a tax loss are not the sort of business
391
transactions contemplated by the terms "sale" or "installment sale.,
As the Tax Court found, the LIBOR note transaction was a mere
artifice designed to create a tax loss:
Each of the steps in the section 453 investment strategy
was planned and arrangements commenced considerably
in advance of execution. Before the negotiations to form
ACM, Merrill had already begun negotiations to
purchase the Citicorp Notes. Before their purchase,
Merrill was negotiating for their disposition. By the time
ACM acquired the LIBOR Notes, Merrill was arranging
with Sparekassen the terms on which some of them

389. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, at 83.
390. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in enterprisesindustrial, commercial, financial, or any other-might wish to consolidate,
or divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings. Such transactions
were not to be considered as "realizing" any profit, because the collective
interests still remained in solution. But the underlying presupposition is
plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to
the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident,
egregious to its prosecution.
Id.
391. See Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) ("To permit the true
nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax
liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress.").
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would be sold. The contingent payment sale was
scheduled to take place before the end of ACM's first
taxable year in order to permit the partnership to spread
its tax basis in the Citicorp Notes over 6 years instead of
5. The distribution and sale of the BFCE Notes was
scheduled to occur before the end of Colgate's 1989
taxable year in order to offset Southampton's share of
the contingent payment sale gain on Colgate's
consolidated return. It was the understanding of the
principals that Kannex would retire from the partnership
by the fall of 1991 so that the LIBOR Notes could be
sold in time for Colgate to carry back the taxable loss to
its 1988 taxable year. No supervening market forces or
other nontax considerations disrupted the scheduled
execution of these steps. 92
Therefore, the transaction was not a genuine sale in the sense
contemplated by the statute and thus was not consistent with the
language
of the statute or intent of Congress when it enacted the
S• 393
provision.

The obvious criticism of this conclusion is that it is really no different
from the court's determination in ACM Partnershipthat the transaction
lacked economic substance. Admittedly, in many respects, the factors
and the analysis are the same. Both the proposed standard and the
economic substance look at the nature of the transaction and not
whether the transaction superficially satisfied the language of the
statute. And there is a certain "I know it when I see it" aspect to the
conclusion that a pre-ordained set of transactions between
accommodating parties is not a true sale. But the crucial distinction is
that the proposed standard does not look outside the language and the
392. ACM P'ship, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) at 139-41.
witness, who testified that:

The court cited the IRS's expert

[Tihe transactions and the returns were the result of a carefully crafted
and faithfully executed sequence of sophisticated and costly financial
maneuvers that left little to chance or market opportunities. The score for
the Partnership's actions was very detailed and the libretto even included
the writing of the minutes of the Partnership meetings weeks before those
meetings occurred.
Id. at 140 n.26.
393. Compare a Subchapter S election, which admittedly is only done to avoid
corporate-level taxes.
However, making such an election to avoid taxes is clearly
contemplated within the language and purpose of the statute.
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purpose of the statute at issue to find the answer, while employing the
economic substance doctrine requires the use of "an overriding legal
principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard
to the language or purpose of any particular provision."3 "4
As I hope I have shown, the selective invocation of the economic
substance and business purpose doctrines is problematic. What the
analysis of the ACM Partnership transaction does show is that a
standard that focuses on the text and the purposes of the statute can be
used to limit shelters and other abusive transactions. The proposed
standard was not designed to deal specifically with tax shelters, but was
intended as a standard of broad application that would encourage
legitimate tax advice. If we can base the standard on the -language and
purpose of the statute and still restrain shelters, the debate has, in my
view, moved in the right direction.
E. The Role of the Bar
If the current bottling of the tax shelter brine has taught us anything
it is that the IRS cannot solve the shelter problem without the help of
the bar and tax professionals in general. Professor Eustice noted the
efficacy of enlisting the tax bar,39 5 and others have noted the bar's key
role in these matters. 9 6 The enforcement budget is insufficient for the
government to ever fully win the tax shelter war.397 The bar must
therefore recognize its role as both the cause of the problem and as part
of the solution.3 98 The tax shelter boom and related problems could not
394. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, T 29

(UKHC).
395. Eustice, supra note 130, at 164.

396. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 8, at 369.
397. I am not as sanguine about this as Pamela Olson, who stated, "The tax shelter war
is over. The government won." Pamela F. Olson, Now That You've Caught the Bus, What
Are You Going to Do With It? Observationsfrom the Frontlines,the Sidelines, and Between
the Lines, So to Speak, 60 TAX LAw. 567, 567 (2007).
398. Matthew Ames noted:

Changing the ethics of tax advisors and return preparers is such a
collateral method [of altering taxpayer ethics]; the less willing a tax
advisor is to go along with a scheme, the less likely the client is to embark

on it. "IT]he tax practitioner plays a dominant and most responsible role.
His attitude becomes the attitude of his clients, his basic honesty becomes

their standard of comparison, his sense of morality becomes a guide to
them, for they feel that others are abiding by the same high or low
standard."
Ames, supra note 350, at 411 (quoting Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning,10 N.Y.U.
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have occurred without lawyers and accountants. 399 Thus, if tax
professionals and taxpayers are stymied by the government's actions in
this area, we have ourselves primarily to blame.
The tax bar can, of course, adhere to its position that the filing of a
tax return is the first step in an adversary proceeding and that tax
lawyers may advocate any position that has just a realistic possibility of
succeeding.4" But if we do so, we must follow the lead of Mark Johnson
and ask ourselves: "Are we sentimentally defending an outworn
morality with anachronistic shibboleths? Or, worse, are we cynically
defending a code of convenience as the product of sacred professional
obligations? 40 ' The bar must also recognize that there is no guarantee
that the reliance on the advice of a professional as a defense to tax
penalties will or should continue. And without the reliance defense,
taxpayers will be less likely to obtain-and pay for-the advice of
lawyers and accountants. Professor Weisbach has convincingly argued
that there is nothing immutable about the current system of penalties
and the reliance defense.4 2 Indeed, Congress has already enacted one
penalty (§ 6707A).. 3 and proposed another (as part of the codification of
the economic substance doctrine)' for which reliance on the advice of a
professional is not a defense. Moreover, other areas of the law,
including environmental law and securities law, do not permit people to
avoid civil penalties by relying on the advice of counsel. Thus, tax
advisors must recognize their central role as gatekeepers and their duty
to the system, 4°5 if not for the sake of the system, then at least for the
sake of their own livelihood.4 6
ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1067, 1083 (1952)).

399. Ames, supra note 350, at 426 ("For a supposedly self-regulating profession to wash
its hands of a problem of which it is an intimate part is shameful.").
400. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
401. Johnson, supra note 37, at 25.
402. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 221.
403. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6707A (West 2007).
404. See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2007.
H.R.2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007).
405. See, e.g., Darrell, supra note 26, at 131; Schizer, supra note 8, at 370-71.
406. Ames, supra note 350, at 427.

The current self-assessment system relies on the integrity of
taxpayers and tax advisors for its success. It is currently in trouble, at least
partly because that integrity is lacking. The profession must at least
attempt to mitigate the problem by protecting that integrity.

By

exercising leadership, lawyers may perform a valuable service for
themselves and for society.
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V. CONCLUSION

The government's desire to "do something" about the tax shelter
problem is understandable. However, in attempting to fix the shelter
problem, Congress and the Treasury should not make legitimate tax
advice and legitimate tax planning more difficult. The tax system is
based on voluntary compliance, which requires a well-informed and
well-advised citizenry. In addition, the rules and standards for tax
advice should encourage tax planning to be legitimate. The general
standard for tax advice must be understandable and straightforward.
Moreover, it must promote advice that hews as close to the intent of
Congress as possible. Basing the standard on a true construction of the
statute, rather than a chance of success, has the greatest chance of
accomplishing that goal.

Id. (footnote omitted).

